Sep 7, 2006

Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation



This article was published in the IPCS website. It was written while I was Associate Fellow, Indian Pugwash Society, New Delhi.

With great power comes great responsibility; also comes the necessity for a country to engage in a cost-benefit analysis on any issue. With regard to the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation, India has been prudently weighing its cost against the benefits accruing out of the cooperative arrangement.

The article published in IPCS website by Alex Stolar titled India at Crossroads: Next Steps in the Nuclear Deal correctly mentions that "India has been given once in a lifetime opportunity." India does need the nuclear fuel for the continuation of its civilian nuclear program and also does get acceptance as a de facto nuclear power as a result of the deal. But the cooperation also furthers US's strategic goals of finding a regional counterbalance to a rising China and of gaining an important ally on the Iran issue. Also, the Indo-US nuclear deal and the resultant nuclear trade have extended a lifeline to the American and other Western corporations whose fortunes were adversely affected ever since the West stopped commissioning new reactors. The recently completed feasibility report by the French company Aveva to set up six civilian nuclear plants in India, with each nuclear reactor costing over one billion Euros, is a case in point.

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Jul 1, 2006

The NSG’s Rio Plenary and the Indo-US nuclear agreement

The article was published in the Indian Pugwash Society's in-house newsletter Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol. 3, no. 7, July 2006, pp. 10-14.

The Plenary Session of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that was held on 29 May 2006 in Rio de Janeiro is a crucial piece in the Indo-US nuclear deal that India and the United States are trying to piece together. The NSG’s acquiescence is crucial in order for the deal to materialise. However, each of the institutions is looking to the other player to make the first move. The NSG is looking for the US Congress to pass the required India-specific legislation before it makes a commitment. The US Congress wants that firstly, the two sides should iron out the differences that have arisen over the issue of future nuclear testing by India. And secondly, that India should move first and draw up safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA). The IAEA on its part wants the layout and designs of the civil-military separation to craft an India-specific inspection agreement.

The NSG Plenary was quite different from the earlier sessions held in March ’06 and October ’05, as for the first time the NSG members actually discussed the Indo-US nuclear deal unlike the March session at Vienna earlier this year where the nuclear deal was largely absent from discussions. The Rio Plenary was thus crucial for it gave both India and the US an opportunity to strengthen their position within the group and to garner more support for the deal.

The Indo-US combine did manage to do garner support from across the spectrum at the NSG meeting with only Sweden, Norway and Ireland being the three major hold outs. [1] Talking about the Rio session, the US ambassador to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, who attended most of the confidential consultations, termed the Rio meeting as "an important step forward" in putting the deal in a broader strategic context. Though, emphasising that there was no deadline, he said, "We would like to have a decision sooner rather than later." [2] This is of immense importance because of the fact that the Group works by consensus and there are a lot of hard questions that the US will still have to answer from various member countries.
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Mar 1, 2006

US Sanctions Two Indian Firms: A Closer Look

This article was published in the Indian Pugwash Society's in-house journal Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol. 3, no. 3, March 2006, pp. 1-5.

As reported in The Washington Times and The New York Times the United States has recently imposed sanctions on nine firms worldwide, which includes two Indian firms under the Iran Nonproliferation Act 2000, for supplying chemicals that the US claims could assist Iran’s chemical weapons program. However, there is more to it than what meets the eye in the recent US decision [1].  The list of sanctioned companies includes six Chinese firms, two Indian firms and an Austrian Steyr-Mannlicher, which makes high-quality assault weapons. The sanctions have been imposed under section 3 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which Congress passed in 2000 to deter international support for Iran's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and missile-delivery systems [2].  The sanctions run till December 2007 and bar the companies from doing business with the U.S. government and prohibit U.S. firms from obtaining export licenses to sell sensitive products to these companies. However, a closer look of this issue is warranted because not all the facts of the case match up. Especially, in the case of the Indian companies it seems as if the State Department could have its concerns misplaced.

The Facts of the Case
The two Indian companies that were sanctioned are Sabero Organic Chemicals Gujarat Ltd. and Sandhya Organic Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. The Federal Register does not mention any details about the materials that were transferred. However, things do look amiss when one gives a brief glance to the media reports as well as the press releases of the two Indian firms. The press releases put out by the two firms does list out the chemicals that were exported by them. Sandhya Organic Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. had exported approximately 1.5 MT of Phosphorus oxychloride – POCl3 and Sabero Organic Chemicals had exported 112 MT of Tri-Methyl Phosphite (TMP) in 2003 to Raja Shimi Industrial Manufacturing Centre, Iran. Both these chemicals come under the Schedule III of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). [3]

Phosphorus oxychloride like Tri-Methyl Phosphite is a chemical weapons precursor. Both these chemicals find a mention under Section III of the CWC. This is mainly due to the widespread recognition of the fact that these chemicals have a lot of innocuous industrial uses. Apart from this even the Australia Group  [4] that follows the CWC classification places these chemicals under Schedule III. [5]

Interestingly, even under the US export classification system the two chemicals are listed under Schedule III. [6] This brings up the question of the rationale behind sanctioning the Indian companies in the first place. Why does the U.S. need to sanction two Indian firms for supplying material that they themselves do not see as dangerous? One question that needs to be asked is whether the US sanctions are a reflection of the paranoia surrounding Iran that exists in the United States.

Understanding the Iran Nonproliferation Act 2000

Given this information it is imperative that the Iran Nonproliferation Act 2000 be studied a little closer. It was on 14 March 2000 that President Clinton signed the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which authorizes him to take punitive action against individuals or organizations known to be providing material aid to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in Iran. By appending his signature on the Act, President Clinton thus ended a two year long stand off with the U.S. Congress on the issue. Earlier, Clinton had vetoed a 1998 version of the bill that focused on missile proliferation to Iran because it required the imposition of sanctions on Russian entities unless the president determined that a waiver of sanctions was "essential" to U.S. national security. The administration argued that the legislation, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998, would harm the administration's effort to garner Russian cooperation on a wide range of proliferation issues. [7]

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Oct 8, 2005

The IAEA Resolution: A Cretan Labyrinth?


This article was published in the IPCS website in October 2005

Iran and IAEA (Indology.net)
Labels of Success and Failure are fickle in diplomacy. The Manmohan Singh government has understood this rule of international relations, following its condemnation from all quarters on the stand it took on the Iranian vote in the IAEA Board of Governors. The foreign policy success of the Manmohan Singh Government; namely the nuclear deal that it clinched with the US, is fast becoming a millstone around its neck.

There has been much talk about the significance of the Indian vote and the impact it will have, in terms of nuclear fuel that India will receive from the United States despite possible loss of Iranian fossil resources. However, there has not been much discussion of the resolution which India supported. This resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors on 24 September 2005 is a very cleverly worded document. It finds Iran in 'non compliance' with its safeguards obligations under the NPT and expresses an "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is entirely for peaceful purposes."

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Jun 26, 2004

NRRCs and Nuclear Stability in South Asia: Structure, Goals, Functions of the NRRCs


This article was written while I was Research Assistant at the IPCS, New Delhi in 2004. 


The 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) envisaged measures that could prevent any nuclear accident, detonation by state or non-state actors from escalating into a situation that could result in a nuclear exchange.

Unfortunately, the Lahore MOU was still-born due to the Kargil conflict and subsequent military coup in Pakistan. The recent CBM talks on 20 June 2004 between India and Pakistan were important because of the fact that they were the first time that the two neighbours were discussing nuclear issues and were attempting to put a framework in place that took into account the changed realities in the post- 1998 tests.

The six-member Pakistani team on nuclear CBMs that visited India in June 2004 was led by Tariq Osman Haider, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the Indian delegation was led by Sheel Kant Sharma, Additional Secretary (International Organisations) in the Ministry of External Affairs. It was decided to set up ‘hotlines’ between the two Foreign Secretaries, with plans also for upgrading and securing the existing ‘hotline’ between the DGMOs are also planned.

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NRRCs and Nuclear Stability in South Asia: History of NRRCs



This article was written while I was Research Assistant at the IPCS, New Delhi in 2004.

Against the recent backdrop of nuclear CBM talks between India and Pakistan, an atmosphere of cautious optimism has been building up. One suggestion that is doing the rounds is that of setting up Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in India and Pakistan. This is akin to the NRRCs that exist between Moscow and Washington.

The US concept of the NRRC came form a Congressional working group sponsored by Senators John Warner and Sam Nunn in the mid-eighties. The NRRCs were perceived as tools of lessening US-Soviet nuclear tensions. At the Geneva Summit in November 1985 President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev discussed the concept of nuclear risk reduction. After a series of meetings held in 1985 and 1986 in the US and the USSR the proposal to set up NRRCs was further refined. Finally, on 15 September 1987 the NRRC Agreement was signed by the then US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that formally recognized the US and Soviet NRRCs. The two centers assumed greater importance because they were the first direct communications link between the two capitals in more than twenty years since the Presidential ‘hotline’ was instituted in 1963.

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