Published in the CBW Magazine: Journal of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 2009, New Delhi, IDSA, pp. 3-7 available at http://www.idsa.in/cbwmagazine/VerificationoftheFMCT_avishwanathan_0408#.UB4Gj6BWDCM [PDF version]
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| WMD Danger Symbols (Source: Wikipedia) |
The successful completion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), some believe, would be an important step towards the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons. The FMCT will affect individual states differently due to the variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and pre-existing inventories of fissile material.[1] It is this difference which has led to divergent opinions among experts as to what the ultimate aim of the FMCT should be and how it fits into the broader arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes. This article seeks to study the current debate surrounding the verification of a future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and posit as to whether the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) could provide a verification mechanism for a future FMCT.
With the recent breaking of the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the perceptible movement at the CD on the issue; studying the nature, scope as well as the implications of any future treaty has become very important.[2] For India, the issue assumes greater significance due to the fact that the Indian government under the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement has made a very clear cut commitment to work with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral FMCT.[3] More importantly, India will be most affected by the conclusion of at future FMCT regardless of the scope of the treaty. This is due to the fact that India possesses no hedge-stocks, unlike the case with most other nuclear-weapon-states (de facto or otherwise). This fact explains the rationale behind the importance that India ties to “effective verification” of a future treaty which is nondiscriminatory, universal and credible.