What are the Objectives, Purposes and Assumptions of IAEA Safeguards?
The objective of traditional safeguards as brought out in INFCIRC 153 is “…the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.”
The central purpose of traditional safeguards is to ensure that nuclear materials are present and used as intended.
The assumptions behind traditional safeguards are; firstly, States joining NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) would declare all nuclear material. Secondly, national intelligence services would identify clandestine activities. Thirdly, clandestine activities would be detected – eventually – as discrepancies in the process of safeguarding declared material.
What is the IAEA Safeguards Process?
As outlined in the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) document on “Nuclear Safeguards and the IAEA System,” the safeguards process consists of three stages:
1. Examination – In this stage, there is an examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, including a declaration to the IAEA of those facilities where nuclear materials will be handled, the design of those facilities, inventories of nuclear materials, and receipts for material transfers and shipments. It is also required of States that are subject to safeguards to establish so-called state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) to keep track of nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. The SSACs submit their records to the IAEA for independent verification.
2. Collection of Data and Information by the IAEA – In this stage the IAEA inspectors independently collect data and information to verify material inventories, operating records, or design information, or, in special circumstances, to clarify unusual findings.
3. Evaluation – In this stage the IAEA crosschecks the data supplied by the states with the data collected by the inspectors to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the data supplied by the state party.
The objective of traditional safeguards as brought out in INFCIRC 153 is “…the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.”
The central purpose of traditional safeguards is to ensure that nuclear materials are present and used as intended.
The assumptions behind traditional safeguards are; firstly, States joining NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) would declare all nuclear material. Secondly, national intelligence services would identify clandestine activities. Thirdly, clandestine activities would be detected – eventually – as discrepancies in the process of safeguarding declared material.
What is the IAEA Safeguards Process?
As outlined in the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) document on “Nuclear Safeguards and the IAEA System,” the safeguards process consists of three stages:
1. Examination – In this stage, there is an examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, including a declaration to the IAEA of those facilities where nuclear materials will be handled, the design of those facilities, inventories of nuclear materials, and receipts for material transfers and shipments. It is also required of States that are subject to safeguards to establish so-called state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) to keep track of nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. The SSACs submit their records to the IAEA for independent verification.
2. Collection of Data and Information by the IAEA – In this stage the IAEA inspectors independently collect data and information to verify material inventories, operating records, or design information, or, in special circumstances, to clarify unusual findings.
3. Evaluation – In this stage the IAEA crosschecks the data supplied by the states with the data collected by the inspectors to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the data supplied by the state party.