Sep 28, 2013

Tel Aviv and Pretoria’s Nuclear Tango

My article published in the journal International Politics, Vol. 4, No. VIII, Summer & Autumn 2011, Tehran, pp. 21-39.

For the complete article (in pdf) click here

South Africa's prime minister John Vorster (second from right) is feted by
Israel's prime minister Yitzhak Rabin (right) and Menachem Begin (left) and Moshe Dayan during his 1976 visit to Jerusalem. Photograph: Sa'ar Ya'acov (Credit: Guardian Website)
The coming together of Israel and South Africa in nuclear, missile and military fields; though puzzling can be understood in the entire geo ‐ political situation the countries found themselves in. Both states were international pariahs and felt that they were surrounded by hostile neighbours. This article tracks cooperation between Israel and South Africa from the 1950s when South Africa began supplying uranium to Israel. Thereafter the bonhomie expanded to training of each other’s scientific personnel. Israel and South Africa also collaborated in the missile field with declassified documents released from South African archives pointing to Tel Aviv offering to sell its Jericho ‐ 2 nuclear capable missiles to Pretoria as well as Pretoria allowing Israel to test its longer range missiles from the Overberg test range. In addition, the bilateral cooperation also extended to testing of Israeli nuclear weapons in South Africa as brought to light by the 1977 aborted preparations and the subsequent 1979 nuclear test picked up by the American Vela satellites. 

For the complete article (in pdf) click here
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Sep 19, 2013

India-Pak CBMs and Cricket: Duck, Six or Somewhere in Between?

My article (co-authored with Aryaman Bhatnagar) published in Generation Why: South Asian Voices, Stimson Center, Washington DC, August 30, 2013

http://southasianvoices.org/india-pak-cbms-and-cricket-duck-six-or-somewhere-in-between/

A simple search will throw up several definitions of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Given deep suspicions of the ‘other’ and unresolved bilateral disputes, Indo-Pak CBMs are seen as a means to establish channels of communication and increase transparency between the two countries. Currently such mechanisms exist to increase military to military ties, greater people to people contact, provide advance notification of military manoeuvres and missile tests among others. Given cricket’s popularity in both countries, it has been seen as a possible CBM. Seen as a ‘quick fix’ to improve relations, given the sport’s popularity, in reality cricket might not translate into much in terms of better Indo-Pak relations.

For the complete article click here

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Aug 29, 2013

Telegraph India quotes me on the current situation in Syria

Charu Sudan Kasturi of the Telegraph (Calcutta) has quoted me in a story on the Syrian crisis and implications for India in today's paper.

“It is not in our interests to support unilateral operations,” Arun Vishwanathan, a former assistant director at India’s National Security Council said. “But I think the opposition will disappear if UN inspectors find evidence of chemical weapons use by the Syrian regime. That is what will be the game-changer.”

I had written an Issue Brief for the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi on the dangers of Syrian Chemical Weapons in September 2012. 

http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/ORF_Issue_brief_45_1347355536755.pdf

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Aug 12, 2013

Nuclear Signals in South Asia

My article titled "Nuclear Signals in South Asia" published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, August 9, 2013 available at http://www.thebulletin.org/nuclear-signals-south-asia

India, Pakistan, and China have been dancing a nuclear tango of late, taking steps that have serious implications for the entire region. The countries need to engage if they are to understand the vocabulary and thinking that underpin one another’s nuclear strategies. India will hold elections in 2014. Pakistan has just gone through a democratic transfer of power. China has a new set of leaders in place after its decadal leadership transition. It will be interesting to see whether and how the nuclear signaling game in South Asia changes, once new leadership is in place in all three countries.

For the complete article click here
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Jul 27, 2013

Hatf-IX/ NASR - Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak deterrence


Rajaram Nagappa, Arun Vishwanathan, Aditi Malhotra, Hatf-IX/ NASR - Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak deterrence, NIAS Report R17-13, Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies, July 2013, ISBN: 978-81-87663-79-9.

The full text of the report is available here

On April 19, 2011 Pakistan conducted the first test flight of Hatf-IX (NASR) missile. The Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) described the missile as a ‘Short Range Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile’. Till date there have been three tests of the missile system on April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013. After each of the flight tests, the ISPR put out a largely identical press statement which stressed on the point that the “missile has been developed to add deterrence value to Pakistan’s Strategic Weapons Development programme at shorter ranges.” Further the press release went on to state that the 60km NASR “carries a nuclear warhead of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes.”

Following the Pakistani tests and claims of NASR being a nuclear capable missile, there has been a lot of analysis pointing to the dangers it poses for Indo-Pak deterrence. However, despite the large amount of literature which has come out following the NASR test in April 2011, not much attention has been directed at carrying out a holistic assessment of the tactical nuclear weapons issue. It is this crucial gap that that this report seeks to address.

The NASR poses important challenges for nuclear stability between India and Pakistan. However, in order to understand the drivers and Pakistan’s thinking behind NASR, it is crucial to get a handle on the countries’ thinking about nuclear deterrence.

The NASR warhead section has been estimated to have a cylindrical section which is 361 mm in diameter and 940 mm long with a conical portion which is 660 mm long. Thus, the important question is whether (a) Pakistan has a miniaturized weapon warhead which will fit into this dimension, (b) whether it has been tested and (c) in the absence of tests, how reliable is the weapon system. Most importantly, in the absence of demonstrated reliability, how confident will Pakistan be in fielding it?

Will Pakistan consider its tested HEU weapons in stock as adequate for its security or will it consider it necessary to diversify its stockpile? Another important question to consider is whether Pakistan will divert all or part of its uranium reserves for production of an untested Plutonium based weapon.

Pakistan’s gambit of using NASR to signal a lowering of its nuclear threshold to counter any conventional military operation by India is likely to pose challenges for robustness of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and India. An important question to ponder over and one that holds some importance for nuclear stability in the Indian sub-continent is whether NASR is leading Pakistan into a ‘commitment trap.’ It would be wise to guard against a situation where Pakistan would be forced to follow through just because of its past assertions. The study shows that a weapon system like NASR has more disadvantages than advantages from all considerations ranging from damage potential to impact on deterrence stability.
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Jul 5, 2013

Aftermath of a Nuclear Attack: A Case Study of Post-strike Operations

My review of Anil Chauhan's book Aftermath of a Nuclear Attack: A Case Study of Post-strike Operations published in India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 69, 2, June 2013, pp. 200-202.

Speaking of the aftermath of a nuclear exchange, Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev is believed to have said, ‘The living will envy the dead.’ This statement captures the debilitating impact of the use of nuclear weapons. Brigadier Anil Chauhan in his book Aftermath of a Nuclear Attack has succeeded in contributing to a better understanding of this complex issue. The author draws upon much of the existing technical and non-technical literature to provide the reader with a holistic picture of immediate and long-term effects of nuclear explosions and the mechanisms in India to respond to such an exigency.

For the rest of the review please visit the India Quarterly link here
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