Published in the IPCS website in November 2007.
There was a sense among supporters of the nuclear deal that if India missed the bus on the Indo-US nuclear agreement, it would come back to haunt us sooner rather than later. What one did not know was that, this would happen so soon. The recent news about the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NCPIL) deciding to shut down 5 units due to lack of fuel though unfortunate is not unexpected. The incident is the result of a mismatch between demand and supply of uranium from operational mines that has hit Indian domestic nuclear power programme quite hard in the last couple of years. Indian companies like the NCPIL have reached a stage in their learning curves where they are able to construct and commission nuclear power plants in relatively shorter time-frames. However, on the supply side, there is just not enough fuel coming out of the domestic uranium mines to power these reactors.
This incident clearly points out the rationale behind the nuclear deal which will allow India to enter into civil nuclear commerce with supplier countries. It is true that India is the leader in the world today in the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) category. It is this self-reliance that India’s nuclear scientists have been working towards despite being denied access to crucial technologies. But, it is also true that India needs nuclear fuel to continue operating its nuclear power plants to their optimum capacities. The most expeditious means to achieve this objective would be buying fuel from supplier countries. Opening of new mines is a time consuming process and in the past few years, several such projects have been held up due to local resistance. The local resistance to uranium ore mining in Jharkhand, Meghalaya and Andhra Pradesh are cases in point. Buying uranium would also enable us to avoid the possible health and ecological hazards of uranium ore mining on local communities.
There is a trend which emerges as one goes through the power generation figures of nuclear power plants during the past couple of years. Across the board, there is a reduction of capacity factor. The only exceptions to this trend are Tarapur Units I and II. This is not surprising as fuel for these units was provided by Russia in 2006. These units continue to be operated at capacity factors of above 90%. On an average, the capacity factor figures for nuclear power plants have fallen from about 82% in 2003-04 to about 50 % in 2007-08. The current situation is definitely not due to the NCPIL’s inability to operate nuclear plants at higher capacity factors. In fact, it had successfully operated several nuclear plants as recently as 2003-04 at capacity factors of about 90% and in some cases even close to 100%. The inference that can be drawn from the figures is that there is just not enough fuel to go around.
Whether one likes the US or not is a moot point. However, it would be wise not to shut our eyes to the realities of world politics. The US is the dominant power in international relations today. It is widely known that the Russians, the French and several other nations have always wanted to enter into civil nuclear commerce with India. But, engaging with these nations without the nuclear agreement in place would mean acceptance of much harsher conditions as compared to what is laid out under the nuclear agreement.
The correct question to ask in the context is whether any other nation could have made the nuclear deal possible? Could such a paradigm shift been effectualised by any other nation. One does not need to be a rocket scientist to figure out that the answer to the above question is in the negative. The Russians in fact, refused to supply any more fuel for Tarapur in 2004 due to the backlash they had to face at the NSG to their decision to supply nuclear fuel for the Tarapur plant in 2001.
Sometimes the task of an analyst entails stating the “manifestly obvious.” So here goes. The nuclear agreement with the US is an enabling tool for India to enter into civil nuclear commerce with other supplier countries. Secondly, nothing in the nuclear agreement stops India from buying nuclear fuel, reactors, technology from other partners like Russia, France, Canada. Also, India is not obligated in any which way to buy its fuel or reactors only from the US. In fact, countries like Russia are likely to offer India better conditions while engaging in nuclear commerce. Most importantly, India needs fuel in order to operate its nuclear power stations at the optimum capacity factor. What India should do to come out of the current imbroglio should be a no-brainer.
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| PM Singh (IBN Live) |
This incident clearly points out the rationale behind the nuclear deal which will allow India to enter into civil nuclear commerce with supplier countries. It is true that India is the leader in the world today in the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) category. It is this self-reliance that India’s nuclear scientists have been working towards despite being denied access to crucial technologies. But, it is also true that India needs nuclear fuel to continue operating its nuclear power plants to their optimum capacities. The most expeditious means to achieve this objective would be buying fuel from supplier countries. Opening of new mines is a time consuming process and in the past few years, several such projects have been held up due to local resistance. The local resistance to uranium ore mining in Jharkhand, Meghalaya and Andhra Pradesh are cases in point. Buying uranium would also enable us to avoid the possible health and ecological hazards of uranium ore mining on local communities.
There is a trend which emerges as one goes through the power generation figures of nuclear power plants during the past couple of years. Across the board, there is a reduction of capacity factor. The only exceptions to this trend are Tarapur Units I and II. This is not surprising as fuel for these units was provided by Russia in 2006. These units continue to be operated at capacity factors of above 90%. On an average, the capacity factor figures for nuclear power plants have fallen from about 82% in 2003-04 to about 50 % in 2007-08. The current situation is definitely not due to the NCPIL’s inability to operate nuclear plants at higher capacity factors. In fact, it had successfully operated several nuclear plants as recently as 2003-04 at capacity factors of about 90% and in some cases even close to 100%. The inference that can be drawn from the figures is that there is just not enough fuel to go around.
Whether one likes the US or not is a moot point. However, it would be wise not to shut our eyes to the realities of world politics. The US is the dominant power in international relations today. It is widely known that the Russians, the French and several other nations have always wanted to enter into civil nuclear commerce with India. But, engaging with these nations without the nuclear agreement in place would mean acceptance of much harsher conditions as compared to what is laid out under the nuclear agreement.
The correct question to ask in the context is whether any other nation could have made the nuclear deal possible? Could such a paradigm shift been effectualised by any other nation. One does not need to be a rocket scientist to figure out that the answer to the above question is in the negative. The Russians in fact, refused to supply any more fuel for Tarapur in 2004 due to the backlash they had to face at the NSG to their decision to supply nuclear fuel for the Tarapur plant in 2001.
Sometimes the task of an analyst entails stating the “manifestly obvious.” So here goes. The nuclear agreement with the US is an enabling tool for India to enter into civil nuclear commerce with other supplier countries. Secondly, nothing in the nuclear agreement stops India from buying nuclear fuel, reactors, technology from other partners like Russia, France, Canada. Also, India is not obligated in any which way to buy its fuel or reactors only from the US. In fact, countries like Russia are likely to offer India better conditions while engaging in nuclear commerce. Most importantly, India needs fuel in order to operate its nuclear power stations at the optimum capacity factor. What India should do to come out of the current imbroglio should be a no-brainer.
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