Published in Generation Why: South Asian Voices, Stimson Center, December 5, 2013
For the complete article click here
India
has been modernising its missile capabilities. It has successfully
flight-tested its longer range missiles like Agni-IV and Agni-V. It has
also made efforts at canisterising its missiles with statements from
senior DRDO officials pointing to the development of missiles capable of
carrying multiple warheads. These developments have resulted in
analyses (here and here,
among others) which argue that India is “moving away from its stated
doctrine of minimum deterrence towards one with more war-fighting like
capabilities.” Such arguments are a simplified understanding of a
complex dynamic that underpins the relationship between China-Pakistan
alliance and India. Also, such an understanding fails to take into
account India’s unique geo-political situation where it shares borders
and a troubled history with two nuclear armed neighbours in China and
Pakistan. Given the dynamic nature of nuclear doctrine and postures,
countries are likely to respond to changing security dynamics.
Therefore, the ongoing modernisation of India’s missile programare in
essence attempts by India to preserve such technological options for the
future rather than for immediate deployment. As such, these efforts are
nothing but natural responses from New Delhi to the changes in its
security environment rather than any move away from its stated nuclear
doctrine.
For the complete article click here
I was quoted in Praveen Swami’s article (June 4, 2014) in The Hindu titled “Arihant propels India to elite club.” Prime Minister Modi was briefed
last week on the nuclear command structure. As India is set to join a
select group of nations with the capability to launch nuclear missiles
from submarines, the article focuses on the issues of command and
control such a development would pose.