Inside the Pakistan Army: Moves on the Chessboard

On April 9, 2015, Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) put out two short press releases. The two-line press releases gave the names of the officers promoted from the rank of Maj. General to Lt. General and details of key new postings. This was the second major reshuffle that has taken place in the higher echelons of the Pakistan Army after General Raheel Sharif took over as the 15th Chief of the Pakistan Army in November 2013. The article examines the recent appointments within the Pakistan Army and analyses the changes that have occurred under current Army Chief Raheel Sharif. Specifically, the possible changes have occurred within the Strategic Plans Division are assessed and predictions on the possible choices for the next Army Chief made.This article was published on the Generation Why website, South Asian Voices, Stimson Center, June 5, 2015. It was co-authored with Ms. Ramya P.S, Junior Research Fellow, NIAS

 
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Commentary: Pakistan’s Nasr/Hatf-IX Missile: Challenges for Indo-Pak Deterrence

My article in the Strategic Analysis, Vol. 34(4), July 2014 pp. 444-448 on Pakistan’s Nasr/Hatf-IX Missile: Challenges for Indo-Pak Deterrence

http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/fR7pGKkY8tYPsW6KRZtW/full

On November 5, 2013 Pakistan conducted its fourth test of the Hatf-IX (Nasr) short range battlefield ‘nuclear’ missile. To date there have been four flight tests of the missile system. After the first three tests (April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013) Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) had put out identical press releases. These statements claimed that the missile had a range of 60km and carried ‘nuclear warheads (sic) of appropriate yield’. The ISPR statement following the fourth flight test of Nasr, a salvo firing of four missiles, was worded differently and did not repeat the claim that Nasr carried a nuclear warhead. Curiously, it referred to the missile’s nuclear capability in a roundabout sort of way. The statement claimed that the missile ‘contributes to the full spectrum deterrence against threats in view of evolving scenarios’.

This then begets three questions. Firstly, what is Pakistan trying to signal by way of the Nasr and what is the significance of the change in wording of the ISPR statement following the fourth Nasr test flight? Secondly, can Pakistan actually fit a nuclear warhead into the Nasr? Thirdly, how credible would Nasr be in Indian eyes and how will it impact the Indo-Pak deterrence relationship.

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India Pakistan Relations: Two Questions on the Way Forward – Part II

Second of my two-part article in the  Stimson Center's website, South Asian Voices, June 2, 2014
http://southasianvoices.org/india-pakistan-relations-two-questions-on-the-way-forward-part-ii/

Despite the agreement on the need for the two countries to engage with each other, there is a difficult question that remains unanswered. The more important and possibly more difficult question is “Who does India speak to within Pakistan?” Does it seek to engage the civilian leadership in Islamabad or should it accept the ground reality and engage with the real center of power in Rawalpindi?

The choice is not a simple one. Engaging with the generals would mean reinforcing the commonly held perception and result in the weakening of the elected civilian leadership. In the longer run, the move could prove counterproductive given the impact that it will have on the democratic forces which are consolidating their base following the recent elections.

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India Pakistan Relations: Two Questions on the Way Forward – Part I

My two-part article in the Stimson Center's website, South Asian Voices, May 29, 2014

http://southasianvoices.org/india-pakistan-relations-two-question-on-the-way-forward-part-i/

There has been a buzz surrounding India-Pakistan relations in recent weeks. The decision of the Narendra Modi government to invite all heads of governments of all SAARC countries and Mauritius to the swearing-in ceremony was seen by many as a positive step. It was as if the incoming Prime Minister had read the words “All the world’s a stage,” in Shakespeare’s As You Like It and had taken it to heart. Many in India felt that by extending the invitation, India had seized the initiative rather than responding to an existing situation, crisis. 

While I was following these developments, two questions kept coming back to my mind. First, Why should India continue to engage Pakistan and what does it seek to gain from such an engagement. Second, who should India engage with in Pakistan?

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Is there a debate about Nasr/Hatf-IX within Pakistan?

Published in Generation Why: South Asian Voices, Stimson Center, February 27, 2014

On November 5, 2013 Pakistan flight tested its short range battlefield missile Nasr/Hatf-IX. The test involved successive firing of four missiles (Salvo) from a multi-tube launcher. As compared to the first (April 19, 2011) flight test which was carried out from a two-tube launcher, the remaining flight tests (May 29, 2012, February 11, 2013 and November 5, 2013) were carried from a four tube launcher.

However, this was not the only – or even the most significant – difference between the four flight tests. The most significant departure was the language used in the Inter Services Press Release (ISPR) press release following the fourth Nasr flight test. The ISPR press releases following the earlier tests here, here and here had unambiguously claimed that the Nasr “carried nuclear warheads (sic) of appropriate yield.” Though the remaining text of the statement is largely similar to the earlier press releases, the statement following the fourth flight-test is different in one aspect. The statement claims that the missile, “contributes to the full spectrum deterrence against threats in view of the evolving scenarios.” 

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India's Missile Modernisation and Credible Minimum Deterrence

Published in Generation Why: South Asian Voices, Stimson Center, December 5, 2013

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India has been modernising its missile capabilities. It has successfully flight-tested its longer range missiles like Agni-IV and Agni-V. It has also made efforts at canisterising its missiles with statements from senior DRDO officials pointing to the development of missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads. These developments have resulted in analyses (here and here, among others) which argue that India is “moving away from its stated doctrine of minimum deterrence towards one with more war-fighting like capabilities.” Such arguments are a simplified understanding of a complex dynamic that underpins the relationship between China-Pakistan alliance and India. Also, such an understanding fails to take into account India’s unique geo-political situation where it shares borders and a troubled history with two nuclear armed neighbours in China and Pakistan. Given the dynamic nature of nuclear doctrine and postures, countries are likely to respond to changing security dynamics. Therefore, the ongoing modernisation of India’s missile programare in essence attempts by India to preserve such technological options for the future rather than for immediate deployment. As such, these efforts are nothing but natural responses from New Delhi to the changes in its security environment rather than any move away from its stated nuclear doctrine.

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Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence

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Agni-V Launch (Source:Wiki)

In an article in the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Dr. Hans M. Kristensen has quoted various statements by scientists of the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) related to modernisation of India’s missile program to arrive at the conclusion that the development and deployment of longer range missiles with multiple warheads and quick-launch capability would “indicate that India is gradually designing its way out of its so-called minimum deterrence doctrine towards a more capable nuclear posture.”

Though the arguments advanced in the paper appear logical and persuasive, they remain anchored in the Cold War logic. The two-party logic cannot be applied to understand the complex dynamic that underpins the relationship between the Sino-Pak alliance and India. Such a caricature of the more complex dynamic tends to misrepresent the realities of the relationship between these countries. 

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Indo-Pak Relations: Moving Beyond Binaries

My tuppence on Indo-Pak relations published as ISSSP Reflections

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Writing in the website of the IDSA, Sushant Sareen describes India’s Pakistan policy as having been reduced to single binary. The main point of debate in New Delhi about its policy towards Islamabad boils down to whether we should diplomatically engage with Pakistan; whether or not our cricket teams should compete with each other; and whether or not our Prime Ministers should meet. On one hand, many like Rahul Roy-Choudhury of IISS, London call for continued engagement as they believe that talking to each other is the only way forward. There are varied views and voices on how to deal with Pakistan. This article looks at the current Indo-Pakistan relations and deliberates upon the importance of establishing levels in Pakistan to compel its leadership into changing its existing policies.

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Understanding Pakistan

My review of Ian Talbot's book, in The Book Review, Vol. XXXVII, No. 10, October 2013, pp. 51-52.

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As a new civilian government  finds its feet following the historic transition of democratic power in Pakistan, it is important to carry out a holistic analysis of the multiple crises plaguing Pakistan. These range from a troubling internal security situation with rampant terrorist attacks to a crisis of governance to a slowing economy complicated by an energy crisis. In recent years, given the troubles plaguing Pakistan several scholars have outlined a pessimistic future for Pakistan that has ranged from implosion of the country, to its breaking up or ‘Lebanonisation’ to carving of an Islamic Emirate from within Pakistan’s territory. What makes Ian Talbot’s book a great read is the fact that it chronologically and in great detail analyses the historical developments in Pakistan and highlights the turning points—beginning with the failure of the first democratic experiment in 1958—which have led Pakistan down the path it currently finds itself in. The strength and quality of Talbot’s scholarship comes across given the fact that he engages with the spectrum of available scholarship on every issue whether it is the link between madrassa education and militancy or poor governance to uneven economic development. This coupled with Talbot’s assessment of the strength and weaknesses of the reading of the issue by various scholars provides the reader with a well rounded understanding.

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Hatf-IX/ NASR - Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak deterrence

Rajaram Nagappa, Arun Vishwanathan, Aditi Malhotra, Hatf-IX/ NASR - Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak deterrence, NIAS Report R17-13, Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies, July 2013, ISBN: 978-81-87663-79-9.

The full text of the report is available here

On April 19, 2011 Pakistan conducted the first test flight of Hatf-IX (NASR) missile. The Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) described the missile as a ‘Short Range Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile’. Till date there have been three tests of the missile system on April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013. After each of the flight tests, the ISPR put out a largely identical press statement which stressed on the point that the “missile has been developed to add deterrence value to Pakistan’s Strategic Weapons Development programme at shorter ranges.” Further the press release went on to state that the 60km NASR “carries a nuclear warhead of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes.”

Following the Pakistani tests and claims of NASR being a nuclear capable missile, there has been a lot of analysis pointing to the dangers it poses for Indo-Pak deterrence. However, despite the large amount of literature which has come out following the NASR test in April 2011, not much attention has been directed at carrying out a holistic assessment of the tactical nuclear weapons issue. It is this crucial gap that that this report seeks to address.

The NASR poses important challenges for nuclear stability between India and Pakistan. However, in order to understand the drivers and Pakistan’s thinking behind NASR, it is crucial to get a handle on the countries’ thinking about nuclear deterrence.

The NASR warhead section has been estimated to have a cylindrical section which is 361 mm in diameter and 940 mm long with a conical portion which is 660 mm long. Thus, the important question is whether (a) Pakistan has a miniaturized weapon warhead which will fit into this dimension, (b) whether it has been tested and (c) in the absence of tests, how reliable is the weapon system. Most importantly, in the absence of demonstrated reliability, how confident will Pakistan be in fielding it?

Will Pakistan consider its tested HEU weapons in stock as adequate for its security or will it consider it necessary to diversify its stockpile? Another important question to consider is whether Pakistan will divert all or part of its uranium reserves for production of an untested Plutonium based weapon.

Pakistan’s gambit of using NASR to signal a lowering of its nuclear threshold to counter any conventional military operation by India is likely to pose challenges for robustness of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and India. An important question to ponder over and one that holds some importance for nuclear stability in the Indian sub-continent is whether NASR is leading Pakistan into a ‘commitment trap.’ It would be wise to guard against a situation where Pakistan would be forced to follow through just because of its past assertions. The study shows that a weapon system like NASR has more disadvantages than advantages from all considerations ranging from damage potential to impact on deterrence stability.

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The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and India

This article was published when I was Associate Fellow, Indian Pugwash Society, Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, No. 4, June 2007

United Nations Security Council

The successful completion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), some believe, would be an important step towards the ultimate goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The FMCT will affect individual states differently due to the variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and pre-existing inventories of fissile material.[1] It is this difference which has led to divergent opinions among experts as to what the ultimate aim of the FMCT should be and how it fits into the broader arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes.

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