Commentary: Pakistan’s Nasr/Hatf-IX Missile: Challenges for Indo-Pak Deterrence

My article in the Strategic Analysis, Vol. 34(4), July 2014 pp. 444-448 on Pakistan’s Nasr/Hatf-IX Missile: Challenges for Indo-Pak Deterrence

http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/fR7pGKkY8tYPsW6KRZtW/full

On November 5, 2013 Pakistan conducted its fourth test of the Hatf-IX (Nasr) short range battlefield ‘nuclear’ missile. To date there have been four flight tests of the missile system. After the first three tests (April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013) Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) had put out identical press releases. These statements claimed that the missile had a range of 60km and carried ‘nuclear warheads (sic) of appropriate yield’. The ISPR statement following the fourth flight test of Nasr, a salvo firing of four missiles, was worded differently and did not repeat the claim that Nasr carried a nuclear warhead. Curiously, it referred to the missile’s nuclear capability in a roundabout sort of way. The statement claimed that the missile ‘contributes to the full spectrum deterrence against threats in view of evolving scenarios’.

This then begets three questions. Firstly, what is Pakistan trying to signal by way of the Nasr and what is the significance of the change in wording of the ISPR statement following the fourth Nasr test flight? Secondly, can Pakistan actually fit a nuclear warhead into the Nasr? Thirdly, how credible would Nasr be in Indian eyes and how will it impact the Indo-Pak deterrence relationship.

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Is there a debate about Nasr/Hatf-IX within Pakistan?

Published in Generation Why: South Asian Voices, Stimson Center, February 27, 2014

On November 5, 2013 Pakistan flight tested its short range battlefield missile Nasr/Hatf-IX. The test involved successive firing of four missiles (Salvo) from a multi-tube launcher. As compared to the first (April 19, 2011) flight test which was carried out from a two-tube launcher, the remaining flight tests (May 29, 2012, February 11, 2013 and November 5, 2013) were carried from a four tube launcher.

However, this was not the only – or even the most significant – difference between the four flight tests. The most significant departure was the language used in the Inter Services Press Release (ISPR) press release following the fourth Nasr flight test. The ISPR press releases following the earlier tests here, here and here had unambiguously claimed that the Nasr “carried nuclear warheads (sic) of appropriate yield.” Though the remaining text of the statement is largely similar to the earlier press releases, the statement following the fourth flight-test is different in one aspect. The statement claims that the missile, “contributes to the full spectrum deterrence against threats in view of the evolving scenarios.” 

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Hatf-IX/ NASR - Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak deterrence

Rajaram Nagappa, Arun Vishwanathan, Aditi Malhotra, Hatf-IX/ NASR - Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Implications for Indo-Pak deterrence, NIAS Report R17-13, Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies, July 2013, ISBN: 978-81-87663-79-9.

The full text of the report is available here

On April 19, 2011 Pakistan conducted the first test flight of Hatf-IX (NASR) missile. The Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) described the missile as a ‘Short Range Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile’. Till date there have been three tests of the missile system on April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013. After each of the flight tests, the ISPR put out a largely identical press statement which stressed on the point that the “missile has been developed to add deterrence value to Pakistan’s Strategic Weapons Development programme at shorter ranges.” Further the press release went on to state that the 60km NASR “carries a nuclear warhead of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes.”

Following the Pakistani tests and claims of NASR being a nuclear capable missile, there has been a lot of analysis pointing to the dangers it poses for Indo-Pak deterrence. However, despite the large amount of literature which has come out following the NASR test in April 2011, not much attention has been directed at carrying out a holistic assessment of the tactical nuclear weapons issue. It is this crucial gap that that this report seeks to address.

The NASR poses important challenges for nuclear stability between India and Pakistan. However, in order to understand the drivers and Pakistan’s thinking behind NASR, it is crucial to get a handle on the countries’ thinking about nuclear deterrence.

The NASR warhead section has been estimated to have a cylindrical section which is 361 mm in diameter and 940 mm long with a conical portion which is 660 mm long. Thus, the important question is whether (a) Pakistan has a miniaturized weapon warhead which will fit into this dimension, (b) whether it has been tested and (c) in the absence of tests, how reliable is the weapon system. Most importantly, in the absence of demonstrated reliability, how confident will Pakistan be in fielding it?

Will Pakistan consider its tested HEU weapons in stock as adequate for its security or will it consider it necessary to diversify its stockpile? Another important question to consider is whether Pakistan will divert all or part of its uranium reserves for production of an untested Plutonium based weapon.

Pakistan’s gambit of using NASR to signal a lowering of its nuclear threshold to counter any conventional military operation by India is likely to pose challenges for robustness of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and India. An important question to ponder over and one that holds some importance for nuclear stability in the Indian sub-continent is whether NASR is leading Pakistan into a ‘commitment trap.’ It would be wise to guard against a situation where Pakistan would be forced to follow through just because of its past assertions. The study shows that a weapon system like NASR has more disadvantages than advantages from all considerations ranging from damage potential to impact on deterrence stability.

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