Indo-US nuclear deal and the Issue of Uninterrupted Fuel Supplies

Indo-US nuclear deal (from Rusin speaks)

On the issue of continued fuel supply in the event of termination of the agreement, the critics of the nuclear deal are jumping the gun when they say that the US would prevent other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries from continuing with their supply of fuel and other supplies to India if the agreement is terminated under US laws. The issue is an important issue that needs to be discussed. However, the ‘Statements of Policy’ or ‘Sense of Congress’ found in the Hyde Act are not the proper reference points for discussion on the issue.

What Indian decision makers need to be concerned about is the nature of exception to be provided by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as well as the bilateral civil nuclear agreements that India will sign with other supplier countries like Russia, France, Canada and Australia. Another point which should be taken into account is that currently there is no NSG requirement which stipulates that if one member terminates cooperation other member countries have to follow suit.

Share:

Read more

The “Nuts and Bolts" of North Korean disablement

Kim Jong-un (First post.com)

Disablement is a word that has crept into the language of the Six-Party talks since it was used by Scott McClellan, the former White House press secretary. In the absence of a more acceptable term, disablement became something of a convenience. There is a general agreement that the current phase is a difficult one. As Christopher Hill put it, the Six-Party talks have reached a point where “they have not been before, beyond just shutting down the facilities.” In such situations of advanced and complex diplomatic negotiations, terminologies become quite important. This is a fact which negotiators to the Six-Party talks have come to realise of late. Christopher Hill pointed this out when he talked about the need to come up with common definitions, “so that we are satisfied when they say they are disabling, we know what they're doing and we agree that it's disablement.”

However, gloating over terminologies is not going to get us anywhere on dismantling North Korean facilities. The task before the international community is to effectively dismantle the North Korean facilities in a manner which allows verification and forensic activities. In August 2007 some ideas were also throw up at the meeting of the denuclearisation group at Shengyang. This was followed up by a five-day inspection of the Yongbyon facility by a team of American, Chinese and Russian experts conducted a five-day inspection in September 2007. However, the five-day inspections and other such future visits will enable experts to adapt the ideas thrown up to suit the actual equipment present in North Korean facilities.

Share:

Read more

The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

This article was published in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses website as an IDSA Strategic Comment
 
In the midst of the domestic hullabaloo surrounding the nuclear deal in India, the United States convened a special meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on September 20, 2007 at Vienna on the sidelines of the IAEA Annual General Conference to brief members on the deal. The NSG derives its important position in international civil nuclear commerce from its membership, which currently stands at forty-five and includes a majority of countries engaged in nuclear trade. NSG members control roughly 80 per cent of the global uranium reserves and about 78 per cent of global uranium production.1 Currently, Namibia, Niger and Uzbekistan are the only three non-NSG countries producing significant amounts of uranium. However, they are party to Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties and once the African and Central Asian nuclear weapon free zones come into force they too would insist upon full scope safeguards for any transfer of nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear weapon states as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NSG members possess a stranglehold on the entire spectrum of nuclear technology, given that there is no supplier country outside of the NSG with civilian nuclear technology.

Share:

Read more

Parsing the Indo – US 123 Agreement

This article was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in the Indian Pugwash Society's in-house journal Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, 6, August 2007

I) What is the 123 Agreement?

President Bush and  Prime Minister Singh (WPR)

The 123 Agreement [1] is an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. It is called the 123 Agreement because in the US Atomic Energy Act, (AEA) 1954 civil nuclear cooperation with other countries is permitted under Section 123. The agreement is the follow-up action by the executive (the President, Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) of an enabling legislation passed by the Congress (in the Indian case this was the Henry J. Hyde Act United States-India peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006).

2) Does the agreement prohibit India from conducting a nuclear test in the future?

No. India has not given up its right to conduct a nuclear test anywhere in the 123 agreement. Article 14(2) of the 123 agreement says:

”The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.”

The above cited paragraph is an interpretation of the possible consequences of testing. It can be interpreted as making a differentiation between an ‘unprovoked’ test by India and an Indian nuclear test that follows similar actions by other states (viz. US, China or Pakistan) which “impacts national security or due to ‘serious concerns about a changed security environment.

Share:

Read more

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

This was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, 5, July 2007.

The genesis of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) and its place in the larger counter proliferation framework


The genesis of the GI can be traced back to US President Bush’s statement where he identified the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a major security threat of the 21st century which required a new, comprehensive strategy.[1] The Bush administration has since then strived to put in place a comprehensive approach to deal with the evolving threat posed by proliferation of WMDs. The US working with the international community has reformed the existing tools and has developed a number of new tools to combat the spread of WMDs.[2]

The US and its allies have put in place several initiatives to combat WMD proliferation over the last five years. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), Missile Defence (MD) and the newly launched Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) are some such initiatives. These initiatives in conjunction with financial measures seek to deny proliferators the means to proliferate WMDs. John Rood, US Assistant Secretary of State in his address at the US National Defence University said, “these initiatives demonstrate the breadth, and the international nature, of the tools we must use – political, economic, intelligence, financial, military, science and technology – to combat today’s WMD threats.[3]

It is in this background that the first meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) partners was held in Rabat, Morocco, on October 30-31, 2006, to establish a Statement of Principles to combat nuclear terrorism.[4] Subsequently, a second meeting was held in Ankara, Turkey, on February 12-13, 2007, where the partners reaffirmed their commitment to the initiative and developed a wide gamut of activities aimed at building the capabilities of participating nations and to take advantage of synergies created through multilateral cooperation.[5] The third and most recent meeting of the Initiative was held at Astana, Kazakhstan on June 11-12, 2007. The main aim of this meeting was to consolidate and build on the foundations laid during previous meetings of the GI.

Share:

Read more

The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and India

This article was published when I was Associate Fellow, Indian Pugwash Society, Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, No. 4, June 2007

United Nations Security Council

The successful completion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), some believe, would be an important step towards the ultimate goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The FMCT will affect individual states differently due to the variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and pre-existing inventories of fissile material.[1] It is this difference which has led to divergent opinions among experts as to what the ultimate aim of the FMCT should be and how it fits into the broader arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes.

Share:

Read more