What are the Objectives, Purposes and Assumptions of IAEA Safeguards?
The objective of traditional safeguards as brought out in INFCIRC 153 is “…the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.”
The central purpose of traditional safeguards is to ensure that nuclear materials are present and used as intended.
The assumptions behind traditional safeguards are; firstly, States joining NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) would declare all nuclear material. Secondly, national intelligence services would identify clandestine activities. Thirdly, clandestine activities would be detected – eventually – as discrepancies in the process of safeguarding declared material.
What is the IAEA Safeguards Process?
As outlined in the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) document on “Nuclear Safeguards and the IAEA System,” the safeguards process consists of three stages:
1. Examination – In this stage, there is an examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, including a declaration to the IAEA of those facilities where nuclear materials will be handled, the design of those facilities, inventories of nuclear materials, and receipts for material transfers and shipments. It is also required of States that are subject to safeguards to establish so-called state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) to keep track of nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. The SSACs submit their records to the IAEA for independent verification.
2. Collection of Data and Information by the IAEA – In this stage the IAEA inspectors independently collect data and information to verify material inventories, operating records, or design information, or, in special circumstances, to clarify unusual findings.
3. Evaluation – In this stage the IAEA crosschecks the data supplied by the states with the data collected by the inspectors to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the data supplied by the state party.
What was the motivation for putting in place stronger safeguards?
Following the 1991 Gulf War and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)/ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections under UN Security Council Resolution 687, the IAEA discovered “an extensive covert nuclear weapon program in addition to, and partly in proximity to, its open nuclear research activities that were under IAEA safeguards.”[1] The following year the IAEA also discovered North Korea was hiding the extent of its previous nuclear material production, (plutonium reprocessing activity in particular) from the agency.
What is the Program (93+2)?
The IAEA Program (93+2) is called so because it was launched in 1993 and was intended to be completed within two years. While planning for the program, the international community realised that it was not only enough to verify that declaration provided by the states was correct but also that it was complete in all respects. The goals of the program were to ensure an expanded declaration where additional information was to be provided to assess completeness. The program also tried to ensure that the Agency should know, and have access to, programs to develop capabilities to produce and use nuclear materials. Additionally, it was also decided to use environmental sampling to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities and increase the use of unannounced inspections
There were two categories of measures that were to be put in place under the Program 93+2:
The first category did not require any additional legal authority by the Agency as these were already covered under INFCIRC/153. This category of measures involved those which were already available to the IAEA but had not been fully utilized. One such measure was the early provision of design information on new facilities or changes in existing facilities with safeguarded material. Another was the use of unattended and remote monitoring. It was also decided to make greater use of short notice inspections. Also, environmental sampling at locations where inspectors already have access, under existing safeguards agreements. Another measure to be implemented was to enhance collection and analysis of information from safeguards declarations and from open sources. The Agency also realised the importance of closer co-operation between IAEA and State (regional) systems for accounting and control of nuclear material as well as the voluntary reporting of imports and exports of nuclear material, specified equipment and non-nuclear material.
The Additional Protocol
The major measure envisioned under the Program (93+2) was that of an Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is “a voluntary agreement between a state and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that is additional to an existing safeguards agreement and seeks to verify both the correctness of declared activities and materials and absence of undeclared activities and materials.” (Emphasis added) The Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.
A signatory state to the Additional Protocol is required to provide to the IAEA information relating to 1) Exports of specified nuclear equipment and non nuclear materials (Annex II); 2) Provide Inventories, exports, and imports of uranium and thorium (not subject to safeguards); 3) General description of all buildings on site of safeguarded facility, their use and contents; 4) Activities related to nuclear fuel cycle R&D not involving nuclear material; 4) General plans for ten-year period relevant to development of nuclear fuel cycle.
“Complementary Access” envisioned under the Additional Protocol provided for broader inspector access to sites of safeguarded facilities to verify absence of undeclared nuclear materials, activities outside the safeguarded facility. It also granted access to locations of nuclear R&D, certain manufacturing that are not on sites of safeguarded facilities. It also allowed location-specific environmental sampling and wide-area Environmental Sampling when IAEA Board approves.
Endnotes
The objective of traditional safeguards as brought out in INFCIRC 153 is “…the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.”
The central purpose of traditional safeguards is to ensure that nuclear materials are present and used as intended.
The assumptions behind traditional safeguards are; firstly, States joining NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) would declare all nuclear material. Secondly, national intelligence services would identify clandestine activities. Thirdly, clandestine activities would be detected – eventually – as discrepancies in the process of safeguarding declared material.
What is the IAEA Safeguards Process?
As outlined in the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) document on “Nuclear Safeguards and the IAEA System,” the safeguards process consists of three stages:
1. Examination – In this stage, there is an examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, including a declaration to the IAEA of those facilities where nuclear materials will be handled, the design of those facilities, inventories of nuclear materials, and receipts for material transfers and shipments. It is also required of States that are subject to safeguards to establish so-called state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) to keep track of nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. The SSACs submit their records to the IAEA for independent verification.
2. Collection of Data and Information by the IAEA – In this stage the IAEA inspectors independently collect data and information to verify material inventories, operating records, or design information, or, in special circumstances, to clarify unusual findings.
3. Evaluation – In this stage the IAEA crosschecks the data supplied by the states with the data collected by the inspectors to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the data supplied by the state party.
What was the motivation for putting in place stronger safeguards?
Following the 1991 Gulf War and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)/ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections under UN Security Council Resolution 687, the IAEA discovered “an extensive covert nuclear weapon program in addition to, and partly in proximity to, its open nuclear research activities that were under IAEA safeguards.”[1] The following year the IAEA also discovered North Korea was hiding the extent of its previous nuclear material production, (plutonium reprocessing activity in particular) from the agency.
What is the Program (93+2)?
The IAEA Program (93+2) is called so because it was launched in 1993 and was intended to be completed within two years. While planning for the program, the international community realised that it was not only enough to verify that declaration provided by the states was correct but also that it was complete in all respects. The goals of the program were to ensure an expanded declaration where additional information was to be provided to assess completeness. The program also tried to ensure that the Agency should know, and have access to, programs to develop capabilities to produce and use nuclear materials. Additionally, it was also decided to use environmental sampling to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities and increase the use of unannounced inspections
There were two categories of measures that were to be put in place under the Program 93+2:
The first category did not require any additional legal authority by the Agency as these were already covered under INFCIRC/153. This category of measures involved those which were already available to the IAEA but had not been fully utilized. One such measure was the early provision of design information on new facilities or changes in existing facilities with safeguarded material. Another was the use of unattended and remote monitoring. It was also decided to make greater use of short notice inspections. Also, environmental sampling at locations where inspectors already have access, under existing safeguards agreements. Another measure to be implemented was to enhance collection and analysis of information from safeguards declarations and from open sources. The Agency also realised the importance of closer co-operation between IAEA and State (regional) systems for accounting and control of nuclear material as well as the voluntary reporting of imports and exports of nuclear material, specified equipment and non-nuclear material.
The Additional Protocol
The major measure envisioned under the Program (93+2) was that of an Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is “a voluntary agreement between a state and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that is additional to an existing safeguards agreement and seeks to verify both the correctness of declared activities and materials and absence of undeclared activities and materials.” (Emphasis added) The Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.
A signatory state to the Additional Protocol is required to provide to the IAEA information relating to 1) Exports of specified nuclear equipment and non nuclear materials (Annex II); 2) Provide Inventories, exports, and imports of uranium and thorium (not subject to safeguards); 3) General description of all buildings on site of safeguarded facility, their use and contents; 4) Activities related to nuclear fuel cycle R&D not involving nuclear material; 4) General plans for ten-year period relevant to development of nuclear fuel cycle.
“Complementary Access” envisioned under the Additional Protocol provided for broader inspector access to sites of safeguarded facilities to verify absence of undeclared nuclear materials, activities outside the safeguarded facility. It also granted access to locations of nuclear R&D, certain manufacturing that are not on sites of safeguarded facilities. It also allowed location-specific environmental sampling and wide-area Environmental Sampling when IAEA Board approves.
Endnotes
I would like to acknowledge Mr David Saltiel and Mr. George Baldwin’s presentation titled “The IAEA Strengthened Safeguards System: Overview of the Additional Protocol,” at the CSCAP WMD Study Group, February 11-14, 2007, San Francisco. This presentation has been used in writing this background paper.
[1] Roger C. Herdman, “Foreword,” U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, OTA-ISS-615, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1995.
[1] Roger C. Herdman, “Foreword,” U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, OTA-ISS-615, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1995.
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