Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation

This article was published in the IPCS website. It was written while I was Associate Fellow, Indian Pugwash Society, New Delhi.

With great power comes great responsibility; also comes the necessity for a country to engage in a cost-benefit analysis on any issue. With regard to the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation, India has been prudently weighing its cost against the benefits accruing out of the cooperative arrangement.

The article published in IPCS website by Alex Stolar titled India at Crossroads: Next Steps in the Nuclear Deal correctly mentions that "India has been given once in a lifetime opportunity." India does need the nuclear fuel for the continuation of its civilian nuclear program and also does get acceptance as a de facto nuclear power as a result of the deal. But the cooperation also furthers US's strategic goals of finding a regional counterbalance to a rising China and of gaining an important ally on the Iran issue. Also, the Indo-US nuclear deal and the resultant nuclear trade have extended a lifeline to the American and other Western corporations whose fortunes were adversely affected ever since the West stopped commissioning new reactors. The recently completed feasibility report by the French company Aveva to set up six civilian nuclear plants in India, with each nuclear reactor costing over one billion Euros, is a case in point.



Firstly, with regard to the objections raised on conditioning the continuation of the Indo-US agreement on the premise that India would never detonate a nuclear explosive device, New Delhi cannot forswear its right to conduct nuclear tests in the future. As the present trends indicate, the US could begin testing its nuclear stockpile. The Bush administration is already attempting to develop new kinds of nuclear weapons. A scenario can thus be hypothesised where a US test, leading Russia to conduct nuclear tests, which in turn resulting in China resuming its nuclear tests. In such a situation, India cannot hope to secure its national interests if it gives up its right to test. The stated Indian position, as made amply clear in the PM's statement in the Parliament is that of a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing.

Another question that the article asks pertains to whether India is a responsible state and worthy of such cooperation if it is unwilling to forswear additional nuclear tests. The US entered into a nuclear cooperation with India precisely because India has been a responsible state and possesses a clean non-proliferation track record. This is the reason that the US did not extend a similar deal to Pakistan despite it having been accorded the status of a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA).

Thirdly, the article mentions that "?the nuclear deal enhances, rather than detracts from India's capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons." The Indo-US nuclear cooperation is only restricted to civilian nuclear technology. The Separation Plan is specifically meant to ensure that any diversion of material or technology between civilian and military facilities does not occur. Moreover, IAEA safeguards which will be put in place will ensure that firewalls between civilian and military facilities in India are up and working.

Fourthly, the tendencies of the Indian strategists towards the IAEA, the NSG, the PSI is far from wary, dismissive or resistant as described in the article. India has been actively engaging with officials from the IAEA in the recent months in their attempts to draw up an India-specific safeguards agreement. It is common knowledge that the NSG has been engaging India, Pakistan and Israel as part of its outreach program since the 1990s. Far from being dismissive towards the NSG, India clearly understands the pivotal role of the NSG in the successful implementation of the deal. With regard to the PSI, India has been actively engaging with the US on the issue. Talks were held on the issue of the Indian participation in the PSI during the March 2006 visit of President Bush. In fact, India has decided to join the CSI and the Jawaharlal Nehru Port is to be the first in the sub-continent to join the Initiative.

With regards to being reticent on the Iranian nuclear program, the Indian government's actions cannot be described as reticent by any stretch of imagination. India has voted twice in support of the West in the IAEA Board of Governors. At the same time, India cannot overlook Iran as an important ally in the Middle East and a crucial source of meeting India's energy requirements. Similarly, the Chinese and Russian policies on the Iranian issue too are conditioned not by a great love for Iran per se, but due to the fact that Iran is very crucial to fulfill their future energy requirements.

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