My article in the Strategic Analysis, Vol. 34(4), July 2014 pp. 444-448 on Pakistan’s Nasr/Hatf-IX Missile: Challenges for Indo-Pak Deterrence
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/fR7pGKkY8tYPsW6KRZtW/full
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/fR7pGKkY8tYPsW6KRZtW/full
On
November 5, 2013 Pakistan conducted its fourth test of the Hatf-IX
(Nasr) short range battlefield ‘nuclear’ missile. To date there have
been four flight tests of the missile system. After the first three
tests (April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013) Pakistan’s
Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) had put out identical press
releases. These statements claimed that the missile had a range of 60km
and carried ‘nuclear warheads (sic) of appropriate yield’. The ISPR
statement following the fourth flight test of Nasr, a salvo firing of
four missiles, was worded differently and did not repeat the claim that
Nasr carried a nuclear warhead. Curiously, it referred to the missile’s
nuclear capability in a roundabout sort of way. The statement claimed
that the missile ‘contributes to the full spectrum deterrence against
threats in view of evolving scenarios’.
This then
begets three questions. Firstly, what is Pakistan trying to signal by
way of the Nasr and what is the significance of the change in wording of
the ISPR statement following the fourth Nasr test flight? Secondly, can
Pakistan actually fit a nuclear warhead into the Nasr? Thirdly, how
credible would Nasr be in Indian eyes and how will it impact the
Indo-Pak deterrence relationship.
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