The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

This article was published in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses website as an IDSA Strategic Comment
 
In the midst of the domestic hullabaloo surrounding the nuclear deal in India, the United States convened a special meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on September 20, 2007 at Vienna on the sidelines of the IAEA Annual General Conference to brief members on the deal. The NSG derives its important position in international civil nuclear commerce from its membership, which currently stands at forty-five and includes a majority of countries engaged in nuclear trade. NSG members control roughly 80 per cent of the global uranium reserves and about 78 per cent of global uranium production.1 Currently, Namibia, Niger and Uzbekistan are the only three non-NSG countries producing significant amounts of uranium. However, they are party to Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties and once the African and Central Asian nuclear weapon free zones come into force they too would insist upon full scope safeguards for any transfer of nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear weapon states as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NSG members possess a stranglehold on the entire spectrum of nuclear technology, given that there is no supplier country outside of the NSG with civilian nuclear technology.

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Parsing the Indo – US 123 Agreement

This article was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in the Indian Pugwash Society's in-house journal Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, 6, August 2007

I) What is the 123 Agreement?

President Bush and  Prime Minister Singh (WPR)

The 123 Agreement [1] is an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. It is called the 123 Agreement because in the US Atomic Energy Act, (AEA) 1954 civil nuclear cooperation with other countries is permitted under Section 123. The agreement is the follow-up action by the executive (the President, Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) of an enabling legislation passed by the Congress (in the Indian case this was the Henry J. Hyde Act United States-India peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006).

2) Does the agreement prohibit India from conducting a nuclear test in the future?

No. India has not given up its right to conduct a nuclear test anywhere in the 123 agreement. Article 14(2) of the 123 agreement says:

”The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.”

The above cited paragraph is an interpretation of the possible consequences of testing. It can be interpreted as making a differentiation between an ‘unprovoked’ test by India and an Indian nuclear test that follows similar actions by other states (viz. US, China or Pakistan) which “impacts national security or due to ‘serious concerns about a changed security environment.

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Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

This was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, 5, July 2007.

The genesis of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) and its place in the larger counter proliferation framework


The genesis of the GI can be traced back to US President Bush’s statement where he identified the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a major security threat of the 21st century which required a new, comprehensive strategy.[1] The Bush administration has since then strived to put in place a comprehensive approach to deal with the evolving threat posed by proliferation of WMDs. The US working with the international community has reformed the existing tools and has developed a number of new tools to combat the spread of WMDs.[2]

The US and its allies have put in place several initiatives to combat WMD proliferation over the last five years. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), Missile Defence (MD) and the newly launched Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) are some such initiatives. These initiatives in conjunction with financial measures seek to deny proliferators the means to proliferate WMDs. John Rood, US Assistant Secretary of State in his address at the US National Defence University said, “these initiatives demonstrate the breadth, and the international nature, of the tools we must use – political, economic, intelligence, financial, military, science and technology – to combat today’s WMD threats.[3]

It is in this background that the first meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) partners was held in Rabat, Morocco, on October 30-31, 2006, to establish a Statement of Principles to combat nuclear terrorism.[4] Subsequently, a second meeting was held in Ankara, Turkey, on February 12-13, 2007, where the partners reaffirmed their commitment to the initiative and developed a wide gamut of activities aimed at building the capabilities of participating nations and to take advantage of synergies created through multilateral cooperation.[5] The third and most recent meeting of the Initiative was held at Astana, Kazakhstan on June 11-12, 2007. The main aim of this meeting was to consolidate and build on the foundations laid during previous meetings of the GI.

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The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and India

This article was published when I was Associate Fellow, Indian Pugwash Society, Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, No. 4, June 2007

United Nations Security Council

The successful completion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), some believe, would be an important step towards the ultimate goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The FMCT will affect individual states differently due to the variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and pre-existing inventories of fissile material.[1] It is this difference which has led to divergent opinions among experts as to what the ultimate aim of the FMCT should be and how it fits into the broader arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes.

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The 123 Agreement and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

This was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, 3, April May 2007. 

What is the 123 Agreement and why is it called so?

The 123 agreement is the proposed agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. It is called the 123 Agreement because in the US Atomic Energy Act, (AEA) 1954 civil nuclear cooperation with other countries is permitted under Section 123. The agreement is the follow-up action by the executive (the President, Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) of an enabling legislation passed by the Congress (in the Indian case this was the Henry J. Hyde Act United States-India peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006).

The United States has entered into Agreements for Cooperation with the following states or group of states (24 in total): Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Indonesia, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand and Ukraine.

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IAEA Safeguards Regime

This was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in Proliferation and Arms Control, Feb-March 2007, Vol IV, No. 2. The article was written while I was working as Associate Fellow at the Society.

What are the Objectives, Purposes and Assumptions of IAEA Safeguards?

The objective of traditional safeguards as brought out in INFCIRC 153 is “…the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.”

The central purpose of traditional safeguards is to ensure that nuclear materials are present and used as intended.

The assumptions behind traditional safeguards are; firstly, States joining NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) would declare all nuclear material. Secondly, national intelligence services would identify clandestine activities. Thirdly, clandestine activities would be detected – eventually – as discrepancies in the process of safeguarding declared material.

What is the IAEA Safeguards Process?

As outlined in the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) document on “Nuclear Safeguards and the IAEA System,” the safeguards process consists of three stages:

1. Examination – In this stage, there is an examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, including a declaration to the IAEA of those facilities where nuclear materials will be handled, the design of those facilities, inventories of nuclear materials, and receipts for material transfers and shipments. It is also required of States that are subject to safeguards to establish so-called state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) to keep track of nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. The SSACs submit their records to the IAEA for independent verification.

2. Collection of Data and Information by the IAEA – In this stage the IAEA inspectors independently collect data and information to verify material inventories, operating records, or design information, or, in special circumstances, to clarify unusual findings.

3. Evaluation – In this stage the IAEA crosschecks the data supplied by the states with the data collected by the inspectors to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the data supplied by the state party.

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