Aug 3, 2012

Syria’s CBWs: Clear and present danger

Published in Deccan Herald, Bangalore, Friday, August 3, 2012, pg. 10, available at http://www.deccanherald.com/content/268804/syrias-cbws-clear-present-danger.html (click here for pdf)

The dangers will not melt away in a post-Assad scenario. In fact, they could get much worse.

The 16-month-old civil war in Syria led by a motley of opposition groups to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime has seen several ups and downs. On July 18 the Syrian regime suffered a serious setback when a powerful bomb blast in the Syrian national security council premises killed three members of Assad’s inner coterie which included his brother-in-law Gen Assef Shawkat and minister
 of defence Dawoud Rajha.
Gas Masks being sold near Jerusalem (photo from al-Monitor)

Given the increasing levels of attrition from the higher echelons of the Syrian army in recent weeks, the deaths led to predictions of impending collapse of the regime.

While the collapse theory has a ring of truth to it, it will be preceded by a protracted and bloody conflict. What complicates the matter further is the fact that Syria possesses the largest stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) in the Middle East with the means to deliver them. It is also suspected that Damascus has an active bio-weapons (BW) programme. The active involvement of jihadi groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda in Iraq in the Syrian civil war is a cause for concern particularly with regard to the security of the chemical and biological weapons.

Pubic broadcast

On July 23, the Syrian foreign ministry spokesperson Jihad Makdissi made a public broadcast where he tried to allay fears about the safety and security of the Syrian CBW stockpile. Makdissi’s broadcast is important for several reasons. Apart from being the first ever public admission of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons stockpile, the statement reiterated the Syrian policy of not using these weapons against its own population.

The Syrian programme is believed to have begun in 1973 with initial CW capability from Egypt in the run-up to the October ’73 war with Israel. Currently, Syria has the largest CW programme in the Middle East with over 50 suspected chemical and bio-weapon storage and production facilities. It operates four large CW production facilities at al-Safir, Hama, Homs and Latakia and has over a dozen storage sites spread across the country.
The Syrian BW programme is believed to be centered on the Syrian scientific research council (SSRC) near Damascus, and is suspected to be fairly advanced in terms of weaponisation and dispersal techniques.

Syria is not a member of the international conventions which outlaw the possession and use of Chemical and Biological weapons. Damascus’s chemical weapons stockpile is believed to run into several hundred tones of mustard blistering agents. Syria is also believed to possess large stockpiles of the deadly nerve agents like Sarin and VX. In addition, Syria also runs a chemical weapons research facility near Damascus.

The fact that Syria possesses an effective means of delivering these weapons make the situation more dangerous. Syria possesses an estimated 700 scud missiles and its variants in addition to the short-range solid fuelled SS-21. The missiles are believed to be capable of carrying warheads filled with sarin nerve agents.

The advanced state of Syria’s chemical and bio-weapon and missile capability pose several dangers. One apparent fear is the possibility of the CBW weapons falling into the hands of the jihadi groups in case the Assad regime collapses.

In the light of recent statements, the possible use of these weapons against foreign troops in case of international intervention also cannot be discounted. Another danger if the current trends continue could be the use of these weapons against the insurgents by the Assad regime in case its very survival is at stake. Though Russia and the United States have warned the Assad regime against use of chemical and bio-weapons, it might not be Assad’s decision to take or prevent if the survival of the regime is under question.

The dangers will not melt away in a post-Assad scenario. In fact, they could get much worse. With the lack of a central authority security the weapons could also be used by the Sunni terror outfits against the Shiite (Alawaite) and Christian minority. Also, it is not a given that the new regime that replaces Assad would give up the chemical and bio-weapon capability as it could view them as a bargaining chip to be used in any future negotiations with Israel.

The international community has definitely been on the overdrive to put in place plans to safeguard the Syrian WMD stockpile. Israeli leaders like Prime Minister Netanyahu have even spoken of plans to destroy Syria’s capability in case of a collapse of the Assad regime. The situation in Syria is unprecedented. A WMD-armed country has never before witnessed civil strife. The active involvement of terror groups like Hezbollah and the al-Qaeda make the situation extremely dangerous as the collapse of the regime could result in these weapons and the means of delivering them, falling into the hands of these groups. These are dangerous times in the Levant.

(The writer is an Assistant Professor in the International Strategic and Security Studies Programme at NIAS, Bangalore)
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Jul 14, 2012

2011 Libyan Disclosures: 'Take-away' for CWC verification

published in CBW Magazine: Journal of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Vol. 5: 1, January-June 2012, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, pp-. 17-2    [PDF version]

Introduction


Chemical Weapons containers in Libya
Libya and chemical weapons have a long history going back to the 1930s when the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini authorised the use of sulphur mustard gas against Libyan rebels. The decision led to the use of 24 mustard gas bombs on an oasis that was controlled by the Libyan rebels[1]

After decades as a pariah state, Libya was brought in from the cold following the December 19, 2003 statement where the former Libyan dictator, the late Colonel Qaddafi declared that it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes and open the country to immediate and comprehensive verification inspections. This announcement followed many months of secret negotiations that began with a Libyan offer to the British officials in March 2003 to give up its WMD programmes.[2] As part of this process, Libya pledged to eliminate its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification.[3]

As part of the process of joining the CWC in January 2004, Tripoli made a declaration to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) wherein it declared the following materials and capabilities, which were verified by OPCW inspections. These included 24.7 metric tonnes (MT) of sulphur mustard; 1,390 MT of precursor chemicals; 3,563 unloaded chemical weapons munitions (aerial bombs) and 3 former chemical weapons production facilities. [4]

A complex interplay of various factors influenced the Libyan decision. This ranged from economic burden imposed by three decades of economic sanctions that had limited oil exports to a great extent. This in turn resulted in the drying up of new foreign investment which made giving up the WMD programmes so much more enticing. This was buttressed by the fact that Tripoli’s efforts at procuring nuclear and biological weapons were not making much headway though it did possess a ‘moderately capable’ chemical weapons arsenal.[5] Therefore, in the cost-benefit analysis, the Libyan leadership did not see much merit in continuing its WMD programmes.

Between 2004 and February 2011, Libya destroyed 51% of its sulphur mustard stockpile and 40% of its precursor chemicals under OPCW verification. It also irreversibly destroyed one of the three former chemical weapons production facilities by razing it to the ground and converted the other two into pharmaceutical plants after approval by the Executive Council of the OPCW. [6] Destruction of the sulphur mustard started in October 2011. However, it was stopped in February 2011 due to breakdown of the heating unit in the disposal station. [7] The situation has not been remedied as a result of the NATO-led operations in Libya that began in March 2011 when the OPCW inspectors left Tripoli.

November 2011 disclosures

However, on November 1, 2011, the transitional Libyan government declared a “previously undeclared chemical weapons stockpile”. [8] This was confirmed by the British PM David Cameron at the Lord Mayors Banquet where he stated, “In the last few days, we have learnt that the new Libyan authorities have found chemical weapons that were kept hidden from the world.”[9] Reports indicated that chemical weapons were stored at two previously undeclared sites in violation of the 2003 agreement that the former Libyan dictator had reached with the international community. This declaration by the new Libyan government brought to light several hundred munitions loaded with sulphur mustard, few hundred kilograms of sulphur mustard stored in plastic containers and a limited number of unfilled plastic containers (munitions components). The total amount of sulphur mustard declared by Libya stands now at 26.3 metric tonnes.


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Apr 12, 2012

Shifting Balance of Power

Emerging China: Prospects for Partnership in Asia,
Eds. Sudhir T. Devare, Swaran Singh and Reena Marwah,
New Delhi, Routledge, 2012, xxii+412, Rs.995.
Tracking Security Paradigms, The Book Review, Vol XXXVI, No. 4, April 2012, pp. 14,15.

The (re)emergence of China over the last couple of decades as an economic powerhouse with significant military and technological prowess has a direct bearing on India in particular and the global order in general. The re-emergence of China and India in particular has resulted in a shift in locus of global economic power with Asia taking a central role in the current scenario. The Sino-Indian tango during the 2008-9 global economic downturn and their efforts to arrest the global economic slowdown has further cemented their place on the international stage.

This edited volume is the outcome of a three day international conference jointly organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and the AAS between November 21 and 23, 2009 in New Delhi. The conference has been slated to be the first in the series of Asian Relations Conference to mark the foundation day of the ICWA. The excellent design of the themes, chapters and selection of authors is a result of the planning and foresight of the conference organizers which has definitely added value and provided focus to the volume which is in general missing from conference proceedings.

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Mar 19, 2012

Tracking Security Paradigms

India's National Security Annual Review 2010
Ed. Satish Kumar
Routledge , New Delhi, 2011.pp. xv+520, 995.00
Tracking Security Paradigms, The Book Review, South Asia Special Issue - XIX, Vol XXXVI, No. 3, March 2012, pp. 22,23.

Initiated in 2001, the India's National Security Annual Review (INSAR) over the past decade has evolved into a useful companion in studying India's national security challenges. Like the previous volumes, the INSAR 2010 review covers a wide gamut of issues and areas spanning from global security trends to challenges to India's internal security to the state of play in India's neighbourhood to issues a nuclear India has had to grapple with as well as a very comprehensive account of the evolution of the Indian national security system. A very interesting experiment that has been reintroduced-after a gap of three years-in the current volume of the INSAR is the National Security Index 2010. Though, as detailed below, the index is not without its problems and requires further fine tuning, it is nevertheless commendable that an attempt to put forth such an Index has been made.

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Nov 29, 2011

What are friends for? The supply of restricted items to Chashma via China




published in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, as IDSA Comment, November 29, 2011, available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ThesupplyofrestricteditemstoChashmaviaChina_avishwanathan_291111

On November 15, 2011, Xun Wang, a former Managing Director of the Shanghai-based PPG Paints Trading Co. Ltd. (fully-owned subsidiary of the American PPG Industries based in Pennsylvania)
Pakistan's stamp depicting the Chasma Nuclear Power Plant
pleaded guilty to the charges levelled against her before the federal judge at the US District Court at Washington DC. Ms. Wang has been charged with conspiring to export and re-export specially designed high-performance epoxy coatings to the Chashma-II Nuclear Power Plant (CNUPP-II) in Pakistan without requisite export licenses.[1] Ms. Wang - a Chinese citizen and a permanent US resident - has been charged with one count of conspiracy and three counts of violating export laws under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Export Administration Regulation (EAR).

Ms. Wang was arrested on June 16, 2011 at the Atlanta airport and made her first appearance before the US District Court in Washington DC on July 7, 2011. While pleading guilty on November 15, Ms. Wang has reportedly reached a $200,000 settlement with the Department of Commerce and agreed to cooperate with investigators. Ms. Wang’s arrest and guilty plea is intrinsically linked to the December 21, 2010 guilty plea made by PPG Paints Trading, Shanghai, to one count of conspiracy and three counts of acting with knowledge of a violation under various sections of the EAR and the IEEPA. PPG Industries Inc which is based in Pennsylvania and its fully owned Chinese subsidiary PPG Paints Trading which is based in Shanghai, paid a total sum of US $ 3.75 million in criminal and administrative fines and over US $ 32,000 in restitution. The amount of these fines represents one of the largest penalties imposed in the history of the Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce for export violations.

Background
The current proceedings against Ms. Wang trace their origins to the January 2006 agreement signed between the PPG Paints Trading and the Chinese government-owned company China Nuclear Engineering Huaxing Construction Co. Ltd. to supply material to the Chinese companies working at the Chashma nuclear power plant in Pakistan. Huaxing Construction had been sub-contracted by the Chinese government owned Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation which is one of the Chinese companies involved in the construction of the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant.

However, a licence from the US Department of Commerce to export the item was necessary. This was due to two reasons. Firstly, epoxy paint and thinner was designated as EAR 99. This meant that it was not on the US Department of Commerce Control List but, was subject to regulations. Secondly, the Chashma reactor - where the item was to be used - is owned and operated by the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) which is an entity on the Department of Commerce Entity list. Therefore, PPG Industries or any other organisation would require a licence from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to export any material destined to be used at Chashma.

Following the inking of the above mentioned agreement, PPG Industries submitted an application to the US Department of Commerce for a license to export the epoxy paint coatings to Chashma in January 2006. Given that the PAEC was on the Entity List, the license was denied by the BIS. Subsequently, PPG Paints Trading, Shanghai and Ms. Xun Wang (who had joined PPG Paints Trading in May 2006) were informed of this development by PPG Industries.

It is interesting to note that prior to the January 2006 agreement with the PPG Industries, the Huaxing Construction had unilaterally applied for an export license to export the epoxy paint to Chashma on five separate occasions previously. Each time its application had been rejected. The rejection of the PPG Industries application thus constituted its sixth attempt at procuring a license – either directly or indirectly – to export the paint to be used at the Chashma nuclear power plant.

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Nov 24, 2011

Am Back!!!

Hey!

Have not been using the blog for some time now almost four long years.. This is largely due to the fact that I was part of the Indian government and Indian security restrictions do not allow its officers to write in public. A little draconian you say!!! well I hear you...

Nevertheless, I am now back in academics joined as Assistant Professor in the International Strategic and Security Studies Programme (ISSSP) of the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore in early October..

After going through the settling down period, have put on my writing cap.. hopefully will see posts and articles by me on nuclear issues and other issues relating to South Asian security in the days and weeks to come.

In the meanwhile, i am also playing around with Tumblr and have opened a blog there too though its not populated as of now.. will populate it with my earlier articles.. check it out

Ciao
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