This article was published in the IPCS website in October 2005
Labels of Success and Failure are fickle in diplomacy. The Manmohan Singh government has understood this rule of international relations, following its condemnation from all quarters on the stand it took on the Iranian vote in the IAEA Board of Governors. The foreign policy success of the Manmohan Singh Government; namely the nuclear deal that it clinched with the US, is fast becoming a millstone around its neck.
There has been much talk about the significance of the Indian vote and the impact it will have, in terms of nuclear fuel that India will receive from the United States despite possible loss of Iranian fossil resources. However, there has not been much discussion of the resolution which India supported. This resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors on 24 September 2005 is a very cleverly worded document. It finds Iran in 'non compliance' with its safeguards obligations under the NPT and expresses an "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is entirely for peaceful purposes."
There are two important points that have to be emphasised. Firstly, the finding is under two articles of the IAEA Statute, namely Articles XII and III. This is unlike earlier referrals which were under Article XII.C of the Statute, which is of a procedural nature. Referrals under Article III.B.4 are different because they invoke the Security Council's responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, and holds out an overt threat of sanctions punitive measures.
The resolution thus provides the US the authority to take the matter to the Security Council as and when it seems appropriate. It also gives the US an opportunity to establish that the Iranian civilian nuclear programme is a threat to international peace and security in the case of any confrontation with the Iranian regime, which certain to take place.
The 'special verification' inspections that are a part of the resolution are very different from the regular inspections envisioned under normal safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol. It requires Iran to 'provide access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations'. It seems that Iran is in for an UNSCOM/UNMOVIC type of intrusive inspection regime.
Another point to be noted is that the Resolution asks the Iranian government to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity and reprocessing activity in no uncertain terms. By omitting an reference to the 'voluntary and non-legal binding' nature of Iran's commitment the 24 September Resolution turns this voluntary commitment into a legally binding one. A new and further demand has been made in the present resolution to reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water. This demand did not find mention in the last Board of Governors resolution passed on 11 August 2005.
Rather than opening the door to negotiations as the EU and the US would like us to believe, the Resolution shuts the door on future negotiations. The Iranian regime will find it very hard to agree to these demands, given its domestic compulsions. Rumblings have already begun within the Iranian regime. Iran has already threatened halting spot inspections of its nuclear facilities under the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that allows UN inspectors to make unannounced checks of nuclear facilities.
The Indian Government by choosing to support the IAEA resolution has gone against a fundamental principle that it has supported over the last fifty years - that countries can only be held accountable for international agreements they sign. The IAEA resolution that India voted for makes demands that go far beyond Iran's legal obligations. By doing so the Indian Government has set a dangerous precedent which can be interpreted to mean that the safeguards agreement and additional protocols that countries sign with the IAEA need not be the final word on their legal obligations. Someday in the future, this could be used against India.
The Manmohan Singh government has learnt a few lessons over the past weeks. One is that, 'There are no free lunches in the International System'. The United States has demanded its pound of flesh in return for its nuclear deal that takes into account Indian concerns and interests. However, the Manmohan Singh government has to learn to walk the tight rope of balancing national interests with the aspirations of its partners if it wants to survive in the changing international system.
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| Iran and IAEA (Indology.net) |
There has been much talk about the significance of the Indian vote and the impact it will have, in terms of nuclear fuel that India will receive from the United States despite possible loss of Iranian fossil resources. However, there has not been much discussion of the resolution which India supported. This resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors on 24 September 2005 is a very cleverly worded document. It finds Iran in 'non compliance' with its safeguards obligations under the NPT and expresses an "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is entirely for peaceful purposes."
There are two important points that have to be emphasised. Firstly, the finding is under two articles of the IAEA Statute, namely Articles XII and III. This is unlike earlier referrals which were under Article XII.C of the Statute, which is of a procedural nature. Referrals under Article III.B.4 are different because they invoke the Security Council's responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, and holds out an overt threat of sanctions punitive measures.
The resolution thus provides the US the authority to take the matter to the Security Council as and when it seems appropriate. It also gives the US an opportunity to establish that the Iranian civilian nuclear programme is a threat to international peace and security in the case of any confrontation with the Iranian regime, which certain to take place.
The 'special verification' inspections that are a part of the resolution are very different from the regular inspections envisioned under normal safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol. It requires Iran to 'provide access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations'. It seems that Iran is in for an UNSCOM/UNMOVIC type of intrusive inspection regime.
Another point to be noted is that the Resolution asks the Iranian government to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity and reprocessing activity in no uncertain terms. By omitting an reference to the 'voluntary and non-legal binding' nature of Iran's commitment the 24 September Resolution turns this voluntary commitment into a legally binding one. A new and further demand has been made in the present resolution to reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water. This demand did not find mention in the last Board of Governors resolution passed on 11 August 2005.
Rather than opening the door to negotiations as the EU and the US would like us to believe, the Resolution shuts the door on future negotiations. The Iranian regime will find it very hard to agree to these demands, given its domestic compulsions. Rumblings have already begun within the Iranian regime. Iran has already threatened halting spot inspections of its nuclear facilities under the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that allows UN inspectors to make unannounced checks of nuclear facilities.
The Indian Government by choosing to support the IAEA resolution has gone against a fundamental principle that it has supported over the last fifty years - that countries can only be held accountable for international agreements they sign. The IAEA resolution that India voted for makes demands that go far beyond Iran's legal obligations. By doing so the Indian Government has set a dangerous precedent which can be interpreted to mean that the safeguards agreement and additional protocols that countries sign with the IAEA need not be the final word on their legal obligations. Someday in the future, this could be used against India.
The Manmohan Singh government has learnt a few lessons over the past weeks. One is that, 'There are no free lunches in the International System'. The United States has demanded its pound of flesh in return for its nuclear deal that takes into account Indian concerns and interests. However, the Manmohan Singh government has to learn to walk the tight rope of balancing national interests with the aspirations of its partners if it wants to survive in the changing international system.
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