This article was written while I was Research Assistant at the IPCS, New Delhi in 2004.
Unfortunately, the Lahore MOU was still-born due to the Kargil conflict and subsequent military coup in Pakistan. The recent CBM talks on 20 June 2004 between India and Pakistan were important because of the fact that they were the first time that the two neighbours were discussing nuclear issues and were attempting to put a framework in place that took into account the changed realities in the post- 1998 tests.
The six-member Pakistani team on nuclear CBMs that visited India in June 2004 was led by Tariq Osman Haider, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the Indian delegation was led by Sheel Kant Sharma, Additional Secretary (International Organisations) in the Ministry of External Affairs. It was decided to set up ‘hotlines’ between the two Foreign Secretaries, with plans also for upgrading and securing the existing ‘hotline’ between the DGMOs are also planned.
Pakistan put forth its proposal for a ‘strategic restraint regime in South Asia.’ As part of this ‘regime’, it called for the prevention of a nuclear and missile race, an agreement on risk reduction measures, non-induction of air-based and sea-based missile systems and a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence capability. On the conventional front, Islamabad suggested a mutual and balanced reduction of forces and armament levels.
India presented a draft on the pre-notification of flight testing of missiles. This assumes importance due to the fact that even though both sides routinely warn each other about a missile test a few days before, the Pakistani side has not been providing exact details about time and flight path of the missile. This created difficulties in informing merchant ships in the area and keeping them out of danger.
The joint declaration issued by both sides also reaffirmed the unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear explosions, unless “extraordinary events” jeopardised their respective national interests.
To supplement these initiatives both countries could also work towards the setting up of NRRCs in future meetings. The NRRCs are a logical step towards ensuring stability in the sub-continent which is the situation that the talks were attempting to ensure.
India and Pakistan should not wait till there is a resolution to the Kashmir dispute to set up the NRRCs. The NRRCs in fact can help in making the situation conducive for dialogue and building trust between the two nations which in turn could facilitate a settlement of the Kashmir issue.
Where should the NRRCs be located? It would make sense, both in terms of proper functioning and effective control that the NRRCs in both countries be located within the national security setup. The NRRCs in Russia are (and even in the Soviet Union was) located within the Ministry of Defence and in the US it is located in the Department of State.
The NRRCs in South Asia could act as nodal centers linked by secure and reliable communication links to relevant nuclear nodes like nuclear power installations, Ministry of Defence, Atomic Energy, External Affairs, the defence services and strategic forces headquarters and with the National Security Council. The NRRCs would be staffed round the clock by scientists, military officials, bureaucrats from the concerned ministries, and missile specialists. It could be headed by a senior diplomat or military official who has substantial experience in strategic affairs and most importantly in nuclear issues.
In the South Asian context the NRRCs could serve as nodal centers for data exchanges and notifications of existing agreements. This would go a long way in assisting monitoring and reducing or even doing away with misperceptions or distortions in communication thus laying a ground for the resolution of other issues as well. They could also help in institutionalizing unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures for nuclear risk reduction, arms control and force reduction in the region (if any such agreement is reached in the future).
The NRRCs between India and Pakistan could also be utilized to exchange official communication, advance information about missile launches and military exercises. They could also be used send to ‘goodwill messages’ during times of crisis.
However one may perceive the situation in South Asia, post-1998 ? as a situation where there is less likelihood of nuclear war because both countries realise the danger that the weapons pose or as a situation where the introduction of the nuclear weapons has only made the situation more unstable ? one cannot ignore the importance and utility of NRRCs.
NRRCs will definitely lend more than a helping hand to stabilizing the situation, by ensuring that distortion of communication, accidents, detonation of ‘dirty bombs’ or unauthorized use by non-state actors do not lead to the crossing of the nuclear threshold by either nation in the sub-continent.
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