Dec 11, 2007

Intelligence report on Iranian nukes: Vindication of India's Stand?


This was published on the South Asia Monitor website

India Iran (Rising Powers website)
The mandarins at South Block have every reason to be pleased with the latest US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Iranian nuclear programme. In many ways, the NIE has vindicated the Indian stand on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Indian policy on the issue was centred on three pillars. The first was the support of Iran's right to pursue civilian nuclear technology. The second was the realisation that a nuclear-armed Iran would shift the regional threat calculus which would be detrimental to India's interests. The third was the Indian desire to de-hyphenate the Indo-US nuclear agreement from the Iranian issue. The NIE has vindicated the Indian policy on each of these parameters.

India has for long held that Iran must abide by its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and also clear up the doubts surrounding its compliance with the NPT. Concrete progress on this front has taken place in light of the recently drawn up International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - Iran 'Road Map,' and is reflected in the recent IAEA Director General's report to the IAEA Board of Governors. Though, Iranian cooperation with the Agency is still less than optimal, the process of engagement has begun, which could help clear differences on thorny issues as well as convince Iran on the need to clarify on many unanswered questions regarding its nuclear programme. More importantly, ElBaradei in his statement has said that the NIE "is consistent with the IAEA's assessment of Iran's nuclear programme."

The NIE document perceives Iran as a rational actor whose "decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs." This is definitely good news. If this is the case and if the Iranian suspension of its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 is anything to go by, a combination of inducements and threats "if perceived by Iran's leaders as credible," will prompt Iran to extend its current freeze on its nuclear weapons efforts.

Given the current NIE report, the timing of Iran's earlier decision in the fall of 2003 to halt its enrichment efforts has certainly raised a few eyebrows. The Iranian centrifuge programme is based on P-1 and P-2 models which are know to have been supplied by the Khan network. Therefore, it seems as if the timing of the late 2003 Iranian decision to halt its weapons programme and the interdiction of BBC China in October 2003 which led to the clampdown on the A.Q. Khan network is more than mere coincidence.

The NIE has also vindicated the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) policy on the Iranian issue. In the last couple of months, the Manmohan Singh government has had to shadow-box the non-proliferation ayatollahs on one hand and his left allies on the other; both of whom have been using the Iran bogey to derail the Indo-US nuclear deal. Iran is neither the ultimate criterion of foreign policy autonomy neither the acid-test of India's partnership with the US. To label it as either would be improper. Hence, it is to be expected that the US review of the Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programme is bound to give New Delhi a breather and reduce the salience that it had occupied in any discussion on Indo-US relations.

However, as is evident from the recent articles by John Bolton and Gary Milhollin, the assault by the conservatives on the NIE has already begun. One does hope that the NIE will herald a change in American policy towards the Middle East. Signs of change are already evident as can be seen from the recent Annapolis peace summit. Positive signs also emerged from the recent speech by Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates at Bahrain. Gates said, "There are no impediments to Iran restarting its nuclear weapons programme - none, that is, but the international community." If anything, the NIE points to one fact beyond doubt - the Iranian leadership is malleable to international pressure. This is one lesson we should take out of the NIE.

However, in light of the above, it does seem that Washington would not be able to muster enough support to push for the third round of sanctions on Tehran. Secondly, a re-visiting of American policy towards Tehran is most likely. It is probably imperative that the US engages the Iranians directly. For Washington, it is the need of the hour. For it cannot hope to achieve its political and military objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan without taking Tehran along. A Washington-Tehran dialogue is something that even New Delhi should push for. It remains to be seen whether it occurs during the current administration or the next. Thirdly, the international community must not forget the most important lesson of the latest NIE on Iran. The Iranian leaders are not living in an ivory tower. They are also sensitive to international pressure. Therefore, the international community needs to adopt a carrot and stick policy in order to ensure that Tehran extends its freeze on its purported nuclear weapons ambitions.

Lastly, it is sometimes important to point out the "manifestly obvious." The Iran NIE does say that Iran halted its clandestine nuclear weapons programme in late 2003. However, this does not in any which way give Iran a clean chit. Iran still needs to convince the IAEA on many unanswered questions concerning its nuclear establishment. India, for its part, needs to work with the international community to urge Iran to go further progress on its dialogue with the IAEA. The immediate task before the international community should be to place "real" barriers between Iran's purported desire for a weapon and its actual capability to produce nuclear weapons. Given that an Additional Protocol is yet to in force, the IAEA cannot certify that Iran is not running any centrifuges; the most important among these roadblocks would be to prevent Iran from perfecting the knowledge to enrich and moving to an industrial scale production.

(The author is Associate Fellow with the Indian Pugwash Society, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.)
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