Terrorism and National Security Reform

Review of Jordan Tama's book Terrorism and National Security Reform: How Commissions can Drive Change during Crises published in the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS), Vol. 2, no. 2, October 2012, pp. 268-270. Issuu and PDF

The oldest stunt in every politician’s playbook when one encounters a crisis is to create a commission. The conventional view of commissions is well captured in a joke Tama shares (p.4). The joke by Lloyd Cutler, who was advisor to Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton goes something like this:

“A retiring president leaves his successor three envelopes to be opened in sequence, to learn what to do each time he faces a serious crisis. The first envelope says, ‘Blame your predecessor.’ The second says, ‘Appoint a commission.’ The third says, ‘Prepare three envelopes.’” 

The joke succinctly captures the widespread perception of commissions; that they are created for purposes other than creating results and most do not produce results. It is this conventional view of conventions that Tama sets out to challenge and manages to unsettle with a great deal of success.[1]

The book originates out of Tama’s doctoral thesis at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. This in itself holds several valuable lessons for readers and students of national security which is an issue I will deal with a little later in the review.

Firstly, the book is divided into three parts. The first part outlines the research questions and delineates the existing body of knowledge and the conventional view of commissions. This is followed by outlining the central argument and the method of testing the argument. The next section titled ‘Patterns of Commission Influence’ has two chapters wherein Tama outlines a Theory of Commission Influence and the Impact that National Security Commissions. This section tries to identify the focal points and tries to identify under what circumstances commissions are able to exert the maximum influence. This is followed by the third part titled ‘Commissions and Counterterrorism Policy’ which comprises of detailed case-studies of several blue-ribbon, executive commissions beginning with the Long Commission to the 9/11 Commission and Intelligence Reform.

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Iranian Nuclear Program: An Overview

This was a talk I gave at the Round Table "Iran: A War has Begun" organised by the International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Indian Institute of Science Campus (IISc), Bangalore

The remaining talks, photos, program, bios are available at the following link
http://nias.res.in/research-schools-isss-conf2012-iran.php

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Confrontation, Dialogue and Radicalization

published in The Book Review, Vol XXXVI, No. 9, South Asia XX-1, September 2012, 18-19
 

Irfan Husain, Fatal Faultlines: Pakistan, Islam and the West

Fatal Faultlines is a lucid account delving into many difficult questions which lie at the heart of interactions between Islam, the West and Pakistan. These range from historical confrontation between Muslim and western civilizations and their impact on the current ‘dialogue’ between Muslim countries and the West. Husain studies the roots of terrorism and increasing radicalization. In less than 250 pages, Irfan Husain—a popular Pakistani journalist—has delved into these and many related issues which make our world an increasingly dangerous place in a simple, well researched and easy to read book.

‘Why us?’ is an interesting, yet telling question, which is posed to the author by his American friends in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. It is an important question, which the United States as a country should ask itself in order to extricate itself out of the chakravyuha it finds itself in. Despite American humanitarian efforts in many counties from Bosnia to Pakistan, anti-Americanism is on the rise across the globe. The book, in many ways, is an attempt to answer this central question.

One of the most important sources of this hatred is the result of American support—influenced by geopolitics and economics—of authoritarian regimes in many Muslim countries. During the Cold War this meant keeping pro-Soviet Left wing groups away from power even if it meant extending support to despots. These authoritarian regimes in turn used this support to crush domestic opposition, which were more often than not, led by Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.
Another reason for the widespread disenchantment with the US has been its constant support of Israel Muslims. Why the US despite all its talk of democracy, justice and human rights, can turn a blind eye to the violation of these ideals in Palestine on a daily basis cannot be fathomed. As Husain points out, ‘the fact that the United States is Israel’s biggest patron and strongest ally results in much of this anger being directed towards Washington’ (p. 9).

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Syrian Chemical Weapons: The Danger Within

published by Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi as Issue Brief #45, September 2012, available at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/ORF_Issue_brief_45_1347355536755.pdf

Syrian CW Facilities (World Tribune website)

The Syrian case is a unique one. A country with a WMD-armed capability has never witnessed civil strife before. The active involvement of terror groups like Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda in Iraq coupled with the weakening hold of the Assad regime over large swathes of the country makes the situation grim. This raises the very real spectre of Syrian chemical weapons and missiles falling into the hands of these terror groups.

Given the ongoing civil war in the country, Syria's neighbours and the West have been concerned about the safety and security of the chemical and biological weapons in Syria.1 In a bid to possibly allay these fears, the Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Dr. Jihad Makdissi made a statement at a televised news conference on July 23, 2012. In the statement, Makdissi said,

“Any chemical or bacterial weapon will never be used––and I repeat will never be used––during the crisis in Syria regardless of the developments. All of these types of weapons are in storage and under security and the direct supervision of the Syrian armed forces and will never be used unless Syria is exposed to external aggression”.

The statement is crucial for several reasons. Most importantly, Makdissi's statement is the first public
admission by the Assad regime of possessing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. While the statement reiterates the Syrian regime's long-standing policy of not using chemical weapons against its own population, it also lays down an important “red line.” Possibly, learning from the treatment meted out to Tripoli after it gave up its chemical weapons, Syria has made it clear that it will not use these weapons “unless Syria is exposed to external aggression .

Makdissi's statement can also be seen as an attempt on the part of the Assad regime to reassure the international community that the chemical weapon stockpile continues to remain under its firm control.

In this context, a recent statement by Amos Gilad, head of the Israeli Defence Ministry's political defence department that Syria does remain in full control of its facilities assumes significance. Interestingly, media reports quoting American intelligence officials indicate that the al-Assad regime has in fact been consolidating its CW stockpile. The regime has been moving its chemical and biological arsenal away from northern parts of Syria which have seen more hostilities. While the consolidation could be seen as attempts at securing the CBW stockpile by removing them from harm's way, it could also be seen as a means of lending greater credibility to Syrian assertion of its “red lines” and deter any foreign military intervention.

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‘Chinese Checkers’ at the Nuclear Suppliers Group

published in the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, No. 3695, August 7, 2012, available at http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/chinese-checkers-at-the-nuclear-suppliers-group-3697.html

(Source:ExpressTribune, Pakistan)

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its annual plenary session in Seattle on 21-22 June 2012. As in the previous two plenary meetings, the issue of Indian membership to the NSG and the Pakistani-Chinese claim of supply of two additional nuclear power reactors to Pakistan (Chasma-III and IV) under the ambit of the 1991 bilateral agreement came up for discussion. However, given the internal differences, the NSG was unable to reach a consensus on either issue. This is not unusual as the decision that the NSG takes on both issues will have great bearing on its future course.

Following the June 2012 plenary meeting, two articles authored by former Pakistani diplomats - Asif Ezdi and Maleeha Lodhi - appeared in the Pakistani newspaper, The News, which described the issues as being “two sides of the same coin.” National interest seems to have inflicted the Pakistani diplomats with selective amnesia. One could argue - like the Pakistani diplomats do – that the US decision to offer the nuclear deal to India was driven by strategic concerns.

However, it would be prudent to remember that despite American backing, the deal would not have gone through, but for India’s clean non-proliferation record. In a June 2011 interview to Der Speigel, AQ Khan clearly stated that the Pakistan Army knew of his nuclear ‘Wal Mart’, thereby depriving Islamabad of the ‘fig leaf’ of an arguement that it remained in the dark about the Khan proliferation network. Thus, despite Islamabad crying hoarse, its proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya will come in the way of its efforts of securing a similar deal. What the Pakistani authors bemoan is the de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan by the United States, which the Indo-US nuclear deal signifies.

While the issue of India’s membership of the NSG can be seen as the next logical step, and has received support from the US, France, Russia among others, the Chinese-Pakistani claim of ‘grandfathering’ the supply of Chasma-III and IV is a much more complex issue.

This claim is based on the bilateral agreement signed between China and Pakistan in 1991. However, when China joined the NSG in 2004, it had pledged not to supply any additional nuclear technology to Pakistan other than what had already been committed. At that time, China had disclosed that the ‘grandfather’ clause would apply only to life-time support and fuel supply for the safeguarded Chasma-I and II nuclear power plants, supply of heavy water and operational safety service to the safeguarded Karachi nuclear power plant, and the supply of fuel and operational safety services to the two safeguarded research reactors at PINSTECH. This Chinese assertion was publicly reiterated by the then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice in April 2006.

Thus, the Chinese claim - made public in early 2010 – of ‘grandfathering’ Chasma-III and IV contravenes its earlier commitment made to the NSG. Under the current NSG guidelines, Pakistan being a state outside the NPT would have to commit to place all its current and future nuclear facilities under safeguards (full-scope safeguards) as a condition for the supply. The claim of grandfathering the transfer of nuclear reactors is can be seen as an attempt to sidestep this requirement.

The problem with this claim is two-fold. Firstly, the claim of grandfathering cannot be used in perpetuity. China cannot keep expanding the scope of cooperation which it had listed out in 2004. Secondly, in 2006, the group agreed by consensus that any future claim made by a member that specific exports should be considered under the grandfather clause would have to be backed up with documentary evidence, such as commercial contracts with agencies in the recipient state. The demand for clarifications from Beijing by the NSG members should be seen in this context.

As Mark Hibbs states, Beijing in mid-2011 informed the NSG that in 2004 it had appraised the IAEA of its intended future exports of nuclear reactors to Pakistan as part of an expanded declaration of its nuclear activities under the Additional Protocol. This claim cannot be verified because communication between the IAEA and the member states regarding the implementation of the Additional Protocol are confidential.

Thus, the NSG is faced with a Hobson’s choice. It can either choose to let the current Chinese-Pakistani claim be, in the hope that it would not be repeated in the future. However, as reports indicate, plans already seem afoot for the transfer of two additional nuclear power reactors at Karachi by China. If China claims - as is suspected it will - that these too are grandfathered under the ambit of the 1991 agreement, Beijing would in essence be throwing down the gauntlet to the NSG. Beijing could be doing this as it possibly believes that the groups’ members would not like to push it to the brink, as it would only harm the NSG’s credibility. However, it is possible that since adherence to NSG Guidelines are voluntary, China is trying to test how far it can go before reaching break-point. In any case, the NSG will have to confront the challenge posed by Beijing’s supply of power reactors to Pakistan, especially since it is inconsistent with China’s past commitments to the NSG.

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Syria’s CBWs: Clear and present danger

Published in Deccan Herald, Bangalore, Friday, August 3, 2012, pg. 10, available at http://www.deccanherald.com/content/268804/syrias-cbws-clear-present-danger.html (click here for pdf)

The dangers will not melt away in a post-Assad scenario. In fact, they could get much worse.

The 16-month-old civil war in Syria led by a motley of opposition groups to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime has seen several ups and downs. On July 18 the Syrian regime suffered a serious setback when a powerful bomb blast in the Syrian national security council premises killed three members of Assad’s inner coterie which included his brother-in-law Gen Assef Shawkat and minister
 of defence Dawoud Rajha.

Gas Masks being sold near Jerusalem (photo from al-Monitor)

Given the increasing levels of attrition from the higher echelons of the Syrian army in recent weeks, the deaths led to predictions of impending collapse of the regime.

While the collapse theory has a ring of truth to it, it will be preceded by a protracted and bloody conflict. What complicates the matter further is the fact that Syria possesses the largest stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) in the Middle East with the means to deliver them. It is also suspected that Damascus has an active bio-weapons (BW) programme. The active involvement of jihadi groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda in Iraq in the Syrian civil war is a cause for concern particularly with regard to the security of the chemical and biological weapons.

Pubic broadcast

On July 23, the Syrian foreign ministry spokesperson Jihad Makdissi made a public broadcast where he tried to allay fears about the safety and security of the Syrian CBW stockpile. Makdissi’s broadcast is important for several reasons. Apart from being the first ever public admission of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons stockpile, the statement reiterated the Syrian policy of not using these weapons against its own population.

The Syrian programme is believed to have begun in 1973 with initial CW capability from Egypt in the run-up to the October ’73 war with Israel. Currently, Syria has the largest CW programme in the Middle East with over 50 suspected chemical and bio-weapon storage and production facilities. It operates four large CW production facilities at al-Safir, Hama, Homs and Latakia and has over a dozen storage sites spread across the country.
The Syrian BW programme is believed to be centered on the Syrian scientific research council (SSRC) near Damascus, and is suspected to be fairly advanced in terms of weaponisation and dispersal techniques.

Syria is not a member of the international conventions which outlaw the possession and use of Chemical and Biological weapons. Damascus’s chemical weapons stockpile is believed to run into several hundred tones of mustard blistering agents. Syria is also believed to possess large stockpiles of the deadly nerve agents like Sarin and VX. In addition, Syria also runs a chemical weapons research facility near Damascus.

The fact that Syria possesses an effective means of delivering these weapons make the situation more dangerous. Syria possesses an estimated 700 scud missiles and its variants in addition to the short-range solid fuelled SS-21. The missiles are believed to be capable of carrying warheads filled with sarin nerve agents.

The advanced state of Syria’s chemical and bio-weapon and missile capability pose several dangers. One apparent fear is the possibility of the CBW weapons falling into the hands of the jihadi groups in case the Assad regime collapses.

In the light of recent statements, the possible use of these weapons against foreign troops in case of international intervention also cannot be discounted. Another danger if the current trends continue could be the use of these weapons against the insurgents by the Assad regime in case its very survival is at stake. Though Russia and the United States have warned the Assad regime against use of chemical and bio-weapons, it might not be Assad’s decision to take or prevent if the survival of the regime is under question.

The dangers will not melt away in a post-Assad scenario. In fact, they could get much worse. With the lack of a central authority security the weapons could also be used by the Sunni terror outfits against the Shiite (Alawaite) and Christian minority. Also, it is not a given that the new regime that replaces Assad would give up the chemical and bio-weapon capability as it could view them as a bargaining chip to be used in any future negotiations with Israel.

The international community has definitely been on the overdrive to put in place plans to safeguard the Syrian WMD stockpile. Israeli leaders like Prime Minister Netanyahu have even spoken of plans to destroy Syria’s capability in case of a collapse of the Assad regime. The situation in Syria is unprecedented. A WMD-armed country has never before witnessed civil strife. The active involvement of terror groups like Hezbollah and the al-Qaeda make the situation extremely dangerous as the collapse of the regime could result in these weapons and the means of delivering them, falling into the hands of these groups. These are dangerous times in the Levant.

(The writer is an Assistant Professor in the International Strategic and Security Studies Programme at NIAS, Bangalore)

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2011 Libyan Disclosures: 'Take-away' for CWC verification

published in CBW Magazine: Journal of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Vol. 5: 1, January-June 2012, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, pp-. 17-2    [PDF version]

Introduction

Chemical Weapons containers in Libya

Libya and chemical weapons have a long history going back to the 1930s when the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini authorised the use of sulphur mustard gas against Libyan rebels. The decision led to the use of 24 mustard gas bombs on an oasis that was controlled by the Libyan rebels[1]

After decades as a pariah state, Libya was brought in from the cold following the December 19, 2003 statement where the former Libyan dictator, the late Colonel Qaddafi declared that it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes and open the country to immediate and comprehensive verification inspections. This announcement followed many months of secret negotiations that began with a Libyan offer to the British officials in March 2003 to give up its WMD programmes.[2] As part of this process, Libya pledged to eliminate its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification.[3]

As part of the process of joining the CWC in January 2004, Tripoli made a declaration to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) wherein it declared the following materials and capabilities, which were verified by OPCW inspections. These included 24.7 metric tonnes (MT) of sulphur mustard; 1,390 MT of precursor chemicals; 3,563 unloaded chemical weapons munitions (aerial bombs) and 3 former chemical weapons production facilities. [4]

A complex interplay of various factors influenced the Libyan decision. This ranged from economic burden imposed by three decades of economic sanctions that had limited oil exports to a great extent. This in turn resulted in the drying up of new foreign investment which made giving up the WMD programmes so much more enticing. This was buttressed by the fact that Tripoli’s efforts at procuring nuclear and biological weapons were not making much headway though it did possess a ‘moderately capable’ chemical weapons arsenal.[5] Therefore, in the cost-benefit analysis, the Libyan leadership did not see much merit in continuing its WMD programmes.

Between 2004 and February 2011, Libya destroyed 51% of its sulphur mustard stockpile and 40% of its precursor chemicals under OPCW verification. It also irreversibly destroyed one of the three former chemical weapons production facilities by razing it to the ground and converted the other two into pharmaceutical plants after approval by the Executive Council of the OPCW. [6] Destruction of the sulphur mustard started in October 2011. However, it was stopped in February 2011 due to breakdown of the heating unit in the disposal station. [7] The situation has not been remedied as a result of the NATO-led operations in Libya that began in March 2011 when the OPCW inspectors left Tripoli.

November 2011 disclosures

However, on November 1, 2011, the transitional Libyan government declared a “previously undeclared chemical weapons stockpile”. [8] This was confirmed by the British PM David Cameron at the Lord Mayors Banquet where he stated, “In the last few days, we have learnt that the new Libyan authorities have found chemical weapons that were kept hidden from the world.”[9] Reports indicated that chemical weapons were stored at two previously undeclared sites in violation of the 2003 agreement that the former Libyan dictator had reached with the international community. This declaration by the new Libyan government brought to light several hundred munitions loaded with sulphur mustard, few hundred kilograms of sulphur mustard stored in plastic containers and a limited number of unfilled plastic containers (munitions components). The total amount of sulphur mustard declared by Libya stands now at 26.3 metric tonnes.

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Shifting Balance of Power

Emerging China: Prospects for Partnership in Asia,
Eds. Sudhir T. Devare, Swaran Singh and Reena Marwah,
New Delhi, Routledge, 2012, xxii+412, Rs.995.

Tracking Security Paradigms, The Book Review, Vol XXXVI, No. 4, April 2012, pp. 14,15.

The (re)emergence of China over the last couple of decades as an economic powerhouse with significant military and technological prowess has a direct bearing on India in particular and the global order in general. The re-emergence of China and India in particular has resulted in a shift in locus of global economic power with Asia taking a central role in the current scenario. The Sino-Indian tango during the 2008-9 global economic downturn and their efforts to arrest the global economic slowdown has further cemented their place on the international stage.

This edited volume is the outcome of a three day international conference jointly organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and the AAS between November 21 and 23, 2009 in New Delhi. The conference has been slated to be the first in the series of Asian Relations Conference to mark the foundation day of the ICWA. The excellent design of the themes, chapters and selection of authors is a result of the planning and foresight of the conference organizers which has definitely added value and provided focus to the volume which is in general missing from conference proceedings.

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Tracking Security Paradigms

India's National Security Annual Review 2010
Ed. Satish Kumar
Routledge , New Delhi, 2011.pp. xv+520, 995.00

Tracking Security Paradigms, The Book Review, South Asia Special Issue - XIX, Vol XXXVI, No. 3, March 2012, pp. 22,23.

Initiated in 2001, the India's National Security Annual Review (INSAR) over the past decade has evolved into a useful companion in studying India's national security challenges. Like the previous volumes, the INSAR 2010 review covers a wide gamut of issues and areas spanning from global security trends to challenges to India's internal security to the state of play in India's neighbourhood to issues a nuclear India has had to grapple with as well as a very comprehensive account of the evolution of the Indian national security system. A very interesting experiment that has been reintroduced-after a gap of three years-in the current volume of the INSAR is the National Security Index 2010. Though, as detailed below, the index is not without its problems and requires further fine tuning, it is nevertheless commendable that an attempt to put forth such an Index has been made.

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