The Week's Nuclear Round-Up: 3-9 December '07

Published in the IDSA's Strategic Digest as part of The Week in Review Section

India

• Debate in Parliament continues; Burns: The 123 agreement is done and completed, Implementation remains; Second round of India-IAEA talks on India specific safeguards begin

Debate in the Parliament continued on the Indo-US nuclear agreement. EAM Pranab Mukherjee speaking in the Rajya Sabha reiterated that the agreement did not prevent India from conducting a nuclear test if it was necessary. Sitaram Yechury of the CPI(M) opined that the deal was not in India’s interests as it would bestow ‘sub-ordinate ally status’ on India as it will bring India “closer to the US positions on global issues as well as on regional strategic concerns.”[1] Nicholas Burns, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on his part noted that the 123 Agreement was “finished … done … completed” and that it just needed to be approved by both governments.[2] The statement gained significance in light of calls for the renegotiation of the agreement during the debate in Parliament.

In other developments, India initiated second round of discussions with the IAEA on the India-specific safeguards agreement.[3] The draft of the text on the safeguards, which would address issues such as assured fuel supply, strategic fuel reserves and recognition of the separation plan, would be ready within December with one more round of talks by the end of the week.[4]

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Intelligence report on Iranian nukes: Vindication of India's Stand?

This was published on the South Asia Monitor website

India Iran (Rising Powers website)

The mandarins at South Block have every reason to be pleased with the latest US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Iranian nuclear programme. In many ways, the NIE has vindicated the Indian stand on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Indian policy on the issue was centred on three pillars. The first was the support of Iran's right to pursue civilian nuclear technology. The second was the realisation that a nuclear-armed Iran would shift the regional threat calculus which would be detrimental to India's interests. The third was the Indian desire to de-hyphenate the Indo-US nuclear agreement from the Iranian issue. The NIE has vindicated the Indian policy on each of these parameters.

India has for long held that Iran must abide by its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and also clear up the doubts surrounding its compliance with the NPT. Concrete progress on this front has taken place in light of the recently drawn up International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - Iran 'Road Map,' and is reflected in the recent IAEA Director General's report to the IAEA Board of Governors. Though, Iranian cooperation with the Agency is still less than optimal, the process of engagement has begun, which could help clear differences on thorny issues as well as convince Iran on the need to clarify on many unanswered questions regarding its nuclear programme. More importantly, ElBaradei in his statement has said that the NIE "is consistent with the IAEA's assessment of Iran's nuclear programme."

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The Week’s Nuclear Round-Up: 26 November – 2 December 07

Published in the IDSA's Strategic Digest as part of The Week in Review Section
 
INDIA

• Moscow assures New Delhi of lifetime fuel supply for the two 1000 MW reactors at Koodankulam; Opposition questions government decision not to sign intergovernmental agreement with Russia; Parliament discusses nuclear deal

Moscow has assured New Delhi of lifetime supply for the two 1,000 MW nuclear reactors, being built with Russian assistance at Koodankulam. This was disclosed by Prithviraj Chavan, the Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office in the Rajya Sabha on 29 November.[i] However, the guarantee did not cover the fuel supply for the other four proposed reactors of 700MW each, the supply of fuel for which would depend on India getting the green signal both from the NSG as well as the IAEA.

The government’s failure to sign an intergovernmental agreement with Russia during the recent visit of Prime Minister Singh was raised in Parliament during the debate on the nuclear deal. A report in The Hindu on 13 November had noted that the government had backed out from signing the agreement.[ii] Dr. Singh on his part clarified that due to the delay in finalising the India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA, it was felt that it will be premature to sign an agreement which cannot be operationalised.[iii] Some analysts however raised suspicions that the government had backed out of the Russian deal due to an apprehension about American displeasure.[iv]

In other developments, the much-awaited Parliamentary debate on the nuclear deal took place on the 28 November. Leader of Opposition L.K. Advani criticised the deal as being “unacceptable to the nation because it is deeply detrimental to India’s vital and long-term interests.” He also declared that if the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance came to power, it would renegotiate the nuclear deal. Prime Minister Singh again reiterated that there was nothing in the agreement which prevented India from carrying out further tests.[v] EAM Pranab Mukherjee noted that the India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA was aimed at ensuring the country’s right to create strategic reserves to meet any interruption in fuel supply, besides securing recognition for India’s strategic programme by accepting the separation plan.[vi]

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The Week's Nuclear Round-Up: 19-25 November 07

India

• Menon holds talks with Mulford; Kakodkar meets ElBaradei; China indicates its support for India at NSG

With the Left parties acquiescing to talks on the India-specific safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the government has quickly got its act together. Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon held a meeting with the US Ambassador, David Mulford on 19 November to discuss the next steps and the timeline for the implementation of the nuclear agreement. It is expected that India would not take more than a few weeks to negotiate the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The three important points of negotiations would be the issue of fuel supply assurances, the corrective measures that India can take in case of disruption of fuel supplies and India’s right to build a fuel reserve.

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The Week's Nuclear Round-Up 12-18 November '07

India

• Indo-Russian Koodankulam agreement fails to materialise; Left allows government to talk to IAEA; PM, Sonia bat for nuclear deal at AICC meeting

The much expected Indo-Russian agreement for the construction of four additional reactors at the Koodankulam site failed to materialize during Prime Minster Manmohan Singh’s recent visit to Moscow. No reasons were assigned for the agreement not being signed.23 Some reports suggested that the decision could be due to the domestic problems that the government was facing with operationalising the nuclear deal.[1]

In other developments, Dr. Singh reiterated during a meeting of the All India Congress Committee that Indo-US nuclear agreement concerned only the civil side of the nuclear programme and would have no bearing on India’s strategic programme. Congress President Sonia Gandhi also affirmed that the deal would facilitate India’s access to fuel and new technologies to fulfil its requirements in the energy sector.[2]

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The Week's Nuclear Round-Up 5-11 November '07

India

• Indian expert to be sent to Switzerland to explain Indo-US nuclear deal; India-Russia to sign agreements for 4 more reactors during Dr. Singh’s visit

Switzerland President Micheline Calmy-Rey told reporters at the end of her New Delhi visit during the week that she had requested Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to send an Indian expert to Switzerland in order to explain the Indo-US nuclear deal.[1]

It was also reported that India and Russia would sign an agreement for building four more nuclear reactors at Koodankulam during Dr. Singh’s upcoming visit to Moscow. Reports quoted an unnamed Russian official as stating that the ongoing civil nuclear energy cooperation between the two countries was independent of the fate of the Indo-US nuclear deal.[2] Russia has also been willing to build fast neutron reactors for Indian power plants after international sanctions are lifted against New Delhi in civil nuclear cooperation.

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It's about the Fuel, Stupid!

Published in the IPCS website in November 2007.

PM Singh (IBN Live)

There was a sense among supporters of the nuclear deal that if India missed the bus on the Indo-US nuclear agreement, it would come back to haunt us sooner rather than later. What one did not know was that, this would happen so soon. The recent news about the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NCPIL) deciding to shut down 5 units due to lack of fuel though unfortunate is not unexpected. The incident is the result of a mismatch between demand and supply of uranium from operational mines that has hit Indian domestic nuclear power programme quite hard in the last couple of years. Indian companies like the NCPIL have reached a stage in their learning curves where they are able to construct and commission nuclear power plants in relatively shorter time-frames. However, on the supply side, there is just not enough fuel coming out of the domestic uranium mines to power these reactors.

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Indo-US nuclear deal and the Issue of Uninterrupted Fuel Supplies

Indo-US nuclear deal (from Rusin speaks)

On the issue of continued fuel supply in the event of termination of the agreement, the critics of the nuclear deal are jumping the gun when they say that the US would prevent other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries from continuing with their supply of fuel and other supplies to India if the agreement is terminated under US laws. The issue is an important issue that needs to be discussed. However, the ‘Statements of Policy’ or ‘Sense of Congress’ found in the Hyde Act are not the proper reference points for discussion on the issue.

What Indian decision makers need to be concerned about is the nature of exception to be provided by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as well as the bilateral civil nuclear agreements that India will sign with other supplier countries like Russia, France, Canada and Australia. Another point which should be taken into account is that currently there is no NSG requirement which stipulates that if one member terminates cooperation other member countries have to follow suit.

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The “Nuts and Bolts" of North Korean disablement

Kim Jong-un (First post.com)

Disablement is a word that has crept into the language of the Six-Party talks since it was used by Scott McClellan, the former White House press secretary. In the absence of a more acceptable term, disablement became something of a convenience. There is a general agreement that the current phase is a difficult one. As Christopher Hill put it, the Six-Party talks have reached a point where “they have not been before, beyond just shutting down the facilities.” In such situations of advanced and complex diplomatic negotiations, terminologies become quite important. This is a fact which negotiators to the Six-Party talks have come to realise of late. Christopher Hill pointed this out when he talked about the need to come up with common definitions, “so that we are satisfied when they say they are disabling, we know what they're doing and we agree that it's disablement.”

However, gloating over terminologies is not going to get us anywhere on dismantling North Korean facilities. The task before the international community is to effectively dismantle the North Korean facilities in a manner which allows verification and forensic activities. In August 2007 some ideas were also throw up at the meeting of the denuclearisation group at Shengyang. This was followed up by a five-day inspection of the Yongbyon facility by a team of American, Chinese and Russian experts conducted a five-day inspection in September 2007. However, the five-day inspections and other such future visits will enable experts to adapt the ideas thrown up to suit the actual equipment present in North Korean facilities.

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The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

This article was published in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses website as an IDSA Strategic Comment
 
In the midst of the domestic hullabaloo surrounding the nuclear deal in India, the United States convened a special meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on September 20, 2007 at Vienna on the sidelines of the IAEA Annual General Conference to brief members on the deal. The NSG derives its important position in international civil nuclear commerce from its membership, which currently stands at forty-five and includes a majority of countries engaged in nuclear trade. NSG members control roughly 80 per cent of the global uranium reserves and about 78 per cent of global uranium production.1 Currently, Namibia, Niger and Uzbekistan are the only three non-NSG countries producing significant amounts of uranium. However, they are party to Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties and once the African and Central Asian nuclear weapon free zones come into force they too would insist upon full scope safeguards for any transfer of nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear weapon states as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NSG members possess a stranglehold on the entire spectrum of nuclear technology, given that there is no supplier country outside of the NSG with civilian nuclear technology.

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Parsing the Indo – US 123 Agreement

This article was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in the Indian Pugwash Society's in-house journal Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, 6, August 2007

I) What is the 123 Agreement?

President Bush and  Prime Minister Singh (WPR)

The 123 Agreement [1] is an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. It is called the 123 Agreement because in the US Atomic Energy Act, (AEA) 1954 civil nuclear cooperation with other countries is permitted under Section 123. The agreement is the follow-up action by the executive (the President, Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) of an enabling legislation passed by the Congress (in the Indian case this was the Henry J. Hyde Act United States-India peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006).

2) Does the agreement prohibit India from conducting a nuclear test in the future?

No. India has not given up its right to conduct a nuclear test anywhere in the 123 agreement. Article 14(2) of the 123 agreement says:

”The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.”

The above cited paragraph is an interpretation of the possible consequences of testing. It can be interpreted as making a differentiation between an ‘unprovoked’ test by India and an Indian nuclear test that follows similar actions by other states (viz. US, China or Pakistan) which “impacts national security or due to ‘serious concerns about a changed security environment.

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Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

This was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, 5, July 2007.

The genesis of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) and its place in the larger counter proliferation framework


The genesis of the GI can be traced back to US President Bush’s statement where he identified the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a major security threat of the 21st century which required a new, comprehensive strategy.[1] The Bush administration has since then strived to put in place a comprehensive approach to deal with the evolving threat posed by proliferation of WMDs. The US working with the international community has reformed the existing tools and has developed a number of new tools to combat the spread of WMDs.[2]

The US and its allies have put in place several initiatives to combat WMD proliferation over the last five years. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), Missile Defence (MD) and the newly launched Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) are some such initiatives. These initiatives in conjunction with financial measures seek to deny proliferators the means to proliferate WMDs. John Rood, US Assistant Secretary of State in his address at the US National Defence University said, “these initiatives demonstrate the breadth, and the international nature, of the tools we must use – political, economic, intelligence, financial, military, science and technology – to combat today’s WMD threats.[3]

It is in this background that the first meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) partners was held in Rabat, Morocco, on October 30-31, 2006, to establish a Statement of Principles to combat nuclear terrorism.[4] Subsequently, a second meeting was held in Ankara, Turkey, on February 12-13, 2007, where the partners reaffirmed their commitment to the initiative and developed a wide gamut of activities aimed at building the capabilities of participating nations and to take advantage of synergies created through multilateral cooperation.[5] The third and most recent meeting of the Initiative was held at Astana, Kazakhstan on June 11-12, 2007. The main aim of this meeting was to consolidate and build on the foundations laid during previous meetings of the GI.

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The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and India

This article was published when I was Associate Fellow, Indian Pugwash Society, Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, No. 4, June 2007

United Nations Security Council

The successful completion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), some believe, would be an important step towards the ultimate goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The FMCT will affect individual states differently due to the variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and pre-existing inventories of fissile material.[1] It is this difference which has led to divergent opinions among experts as to what the ultimate aim of the FMCT should be and how it fits into the broader arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes.

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The 123 Agreement and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

This was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in Proliferation and Arms Control, Vol IV, 3, April May 2007. 

What is the 123 Agreement and why is it called so?

The 123 agreement is the proposed agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. It is called the 123 Agreement because in the US Atomic Energy Act, (AEA) 1954 civil nuclear cooperation with other countries is permitted under Section 123. The agreement is the follow-up action by the executive (the President, Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) of an enabling legislation passed by the Congress (in the Indian case this was the Henry J. Hyde Act United States-India peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006).

The United States has entered into Agreements for Cooperation with the following states or group of states (24 in total): Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Indonesia, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand and Ukraine.

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IAEA Safeguards Regime

This was published as Pugwash India Backgrounder in Proliferation and Arms Control, Feb-March 2007, Vol IV, No. 2. The article was written while I was working as Associate Fellow at the Society.

What are the Objectives, Purposes and Assumptions of IAEA Safeguards?

The objective of traditional safeguards as brought out in INFCIRC 153 is “…the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.”

The central purpose of traditional safeguards is to ensure that nuclear materials are present and used as intended.

The assumptions behind traditional safeguards are; firstly, States joining NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) would declare all nuclear material. Secondly, national intelligence services would identify clandestine activities. Thirdly, clandestine activities would be detected – eventually – as discrepancies in the process of safeguarding declared material.

What is the IAEA Safeguards Process?

As outlined in the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) document on “Nuclear Safeguards and the IAEA System,” the safeguards process consists of three stages:

1. Examination – In this stage, there is an examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, including a declaration to the IAEA of those facilities where nuclear materials will be handled, the design of those facilities, inventories of nuclear materials, and receipts for material transfers and shipments. It is also required of States that are subject to safeguards to establish so-called state systems of accounting and control (SSACs) to keep track of nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. The SSACs submit their records to the IAEA for independent verification.

2. Collection of Data and Information by the IAEA – In this stage the IAEA inspectors independently collect data and information to verify material inventories, operating records, or design information, or, in special circumstances, to clarify unusual findings.

3. Evaluation – In this stage the IAEA crosschecks the data supplied by the states with the data collected by the inspectors to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of the data supplied by the state party.

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